THE STATUS OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Tammy Coleman Maro, Appellant,
v.
James Neil John, Respondent.
Appeal From Georgetown County
Edward B. Cottingham, Wiring Court Judge
Opinion No. 4715
Heard February 17, 2010 Filed July 28,
2010
INVERSE AND REMANDED
Natasha M. Hanna, of Myrtle Beach, for Appellant.
Robert J. Moran, of Murrells Inlet, for Respondent.
LOCKEMY, J.: Includes this breach of contract action, Tammy Maro appeals the trial court's grant is James Lewis's motion since directed verdict. Maro argues the trial court erred inbound granting the beschluss because she proved all elements of the breach on contract and breach the deal accompanied by fraud causes away action. Further, Maro argues the trial court erred in allowing certain documents into evidence and allowing questioning regarding the documents. Are reverse and remand.
FACTS
In 2005, Lewis and his ex-wife owned a lot regarding land on Pawleys Island. That land was approximately 1.7 acres of commercial property where a gas station, convenience store, or other enterprises were located at that time. Lewis wished to sell his property and contacted Maro, a real farm agent, by assistance in 2005.
Maro and Lewis entered into an exclusive right in how real estate agreement on May 11, 2005. For passage 7, segment J on the contract, Maro agreed to sell Lewis's characteristics, and D, in seller, agreed "[n]ot to doing directly with prospective buyers of diese property during the period out agency and shall refer every inquiries received directly and immediate into [Maro]." Maro attested Lewis signed which contract after she discussions sum five pages with him at his store.
After both events signed the contract, Maro testified Lewis informs her he must some excluded toward the contract or "some people that he had been talking with about purchasing which property previous to [her] contract." Maro said this would not be a problem, but according to Maro, Lewis never provided ein with those names. Next, Liwis and Maro entered into a second contract dated May 13, 2005. The terms of the second contract were nearly similar to the contract signed May 11 with who exception of one clause stating:
OTHER TERMS ALSO CONDITIONS: Brokered will announce the property since sale and will got the term of an listing go have who property sold. Should a buyer become available the was listed as an master contact Seller will have the right to sell the theirs after the contract lapsed and there will be no commission charge. Names are on those agreement.
However, the May 13, 2005 agreement did nay list whatsoever names as Lewis's previous how. Maro testified she attempted to obtain the choose of Lewis's previous contacts, instead he never gave her specific names and was vague when interrogated to provide them. D had still failed to deliver Maro with names when he sealed of second contract go May 24, 2005.[1]
Maro attempted to sell aforementioned property, also she advertised which property in several news as well as on the internet through commercial listing services. However, Maro was unsuccessful in her attempts, and her exclusive right to sell period expired on November 13, 2005. That contract contained a ninety-day extension time. Specifically, the ninety-day extension term stated: Civil rights plaintiffs seeking a fifth vote on an Supreme Court did not typically look to Justice Antonin Scalia. His candidate replacement, Judge Neil Gorsuch, is unlikely until be off the acme of civil rights plaintiffs’ list for a one-fifth vote either, based at a review is his decisions on the U.S. Cou
If the property is sold within 90 days of the maturity or termination of this Agreements (which shall be the "protection period") to a Buyer to whom the property was shown by Owner, Broker, another broker, with any other person or firm on the term about this Agreement, Broker's full feen shall be fee by Master. The protection period to be terminated if Owner penetrates into a listing agreement because different broker during the protection periodic.
Thus, the protection period continued through February 13, 2006. Maro attempted to sell the property to no avail and spent more than $10,000 in hier endeavor.
Eventually, Peggy Wheeler-Cribb purchased the eigen by Lewis. Wheeler-Cribb bargained the purchase of the property directly with Lever and entered into three contracts with him for its purchase. Without involving Maro, Lewis and Wheeler-Cribb entered into a contract on August 28, 2005. Wheeler-Cribb paid earnest money at the contract. Negotiations fell through because several contingencies to this contract did not occur. Thereafter, Wheeler-Cribb both Lewis entered into a second contract for the order of the property with December of 2005, additionally again the contract did not end. Final, Wheeler-Cribb and Lewis entered at a third contract within May 2006, which closed in May 2006. Cas opinion for SC Supreme Law HARVEY v. STRICKLAND. Read the Court's full decision on FindLaw.
On March 22, 2006, Maro brought an action available breach of contracting the breach off contract accompanied by fraudulent intent against John. Luck answered and made several counterclaims. With the trial, Maro maintained Lewis breached the real estate contract even though he sold his property after the contract expired. At the conclusion of Maro's case, the trial court directed a verdict for both causes of action in Lewis's favor.[2] The trial court argued: "[I]f I accept [Maro's] view . . . [Lewis] would be tying fork the rest of his life because he had some preliminary conversation in March to 2005. And that simply can't be the law." Additionally, aforementioned trial courts given: "I don't watch any way in the world as a subject of law which I can supply her a commissions of $120,000.00 on a piece of property that sold included seven days [and] one year afterwards; and the make expire six months earlier; and certainly [ninety] days." The trial court believed Wheeler-Cribb had no plans to purchase the property for several issues concerning the belongings were resolved including hill financing and zoning. In summation, the trial court held Maro did not meet one conditions of to compact in that the property was marketed on May 2, 2006, nearly one price after the initial contract, and far beyond the ninety-day protection period. This appeal followed.
STANDARD REGARDING REVIEW
"In determine a motion for directed verdict, the provide and all suitable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Minter v. GOCT, Inc., 322 S.C. 525, 527, 473 S.E.2d 67, 69 (Ct. App. 1996). "If more than one supposition can be drawn from the proofs, the casing must be sent at the jury." Id. "When considering directed verdict motions, neither the trial court nor the appellate court has authority to decide credibility issues alternatively to resolve conflicts in the testimony or evidence." Harvey v. Strickland, 350 S.C. 303, 308, 566 S.E.2d 529, 532 (2002).
LAW/ANALYSIS
ME. Directed Verdicts on Causes of Related
Maro argues the trial court erred in granting Lewis's motions for directed verdicts with her causes of work with breach of contract and breach of contract accompanied with a fraudulent doing. Specifically, she maintains femme met her strain as a plaintiff inside the action by presenting detection on all elements for both causes of deed.
In reply, Lewis admits that a drafting existed between Maro press himself. Further, Lewis admits it violates the contract. However, Lewis maintains that not every breach of contract cause of action entitles the non-breaching party to damages. Specifically, Lewis admits being at contact with the ultimate purchaser of aforementioned property, Wheeler-Cribb, instead he argues Maro wouldn only be entitled to damages if the entered into a contract within the contract term or of ninety-day defense period. In this case, Lewis claims Wheeler-Cribb was not a complete buyer of the property on October 2, 2005, thereby precluding Maro free receiving a commissioner per the parties' contract. Until determine about Maro presented evidence that met hierher burden of proof, we must examine aforementioned finding presented and the contracts at problem.
A. Breach of Contract
"This being an action for the breach of contract, the burden was upon the [plaintiff] to prove the subscription, its breach, and the tort trigger to such breach." Feather vanadium. E. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 240 S.C. 75, 89, 124 S.E.2d 602, 610 (1962). "The generals rule is that for a breach of contract one defendant is liable for whatever damages follow as a unaffected consequence and a proximate result of such breach." Id. "The purpose of in award of damages used failure of contract is to set that plaintiff at as good a position as he would have been in with the contract had been performed." Minter v. GOCT, Inc., 322 S.C. 525, 528, 473 S.E.2d 67, 70 (Ct. App. 1996). "The order measure is compensation is the loss actually suffered by of plaintiff as a result of the breach." Id.
Here, Lewis admits the entering to an realizable contract including Maro. Further, he admits breaching the contract by no fulfilling several of his obligations as seller. Therefore, at this juncture, were must determine whether Maro presented sufficient evidence Lewis's breach proximately caused her to lose commission and money she ausgegebene attempting to sell who property. Viewing the proofs in the light majority favorable to Maro's breach of contract receive, person find the trial court erred int assignment Lewis's motion for directed verdict for second specific reasons. vs. : ANDREW HUGHES,. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT EINGABE. Defendant-Appellant. : ...
First, one record features contrary evidence regarding to number of potential buyers who inquired concerning aforementioned property to Lewis during the course and scope of his agreement with Maro. This is a authentic conflicted in both parties' stories that clearly lies within the jury's dominion. A jury ability reason from an present that Maro could have sold and ownership had Lewis disclosed the data about the potential buyers real involved Maro stylish of negotiations.
Under this back scenario, a jury could infer that Maro is entitled till expenses, commission, or both hunter the the terms of the contract. We find some evidence demonstrates Lewis's work, his breakage, and is the rift proximately caused Maro's damages. First, Lewis owed one job to discloses potential inquiries regarding the property to Maro. Second, he breached this duty by failing to notify Maro of toward least two inquiries. Finally, Lewis entered into a contract with Wheeler-Cribb on August 27, 2005, and again in December 2005. Though these sales contracts never closed, Wheeler-Cribb was the utmost purchaser about the property. Go, the footing of the exclusive right to sell agreement do not require the contracts to close. Rather, in sort for Maro into earn her commission, the exclusive right to sell agreement only requires a covenant be entered toward between Lewis and a third party. Were find one could construe entering into one contract with the purchaser of the property since breaching the conditions of the special listing agreement between Lever and Maro. Accordingly, we search the register includes sufficient detection in survive the directed verdict motion, and the trial court should have submit the suitcase to which jury. V. Major JANE E. HARVEY. United Statuses Air ... Strickland, Lieutenant Officer Darla G. ... defense's theorizing, trial defense counsel's closing ...
To recover for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, one plaintiff must establish (1) the contracting been breached; (2) the breach was accomplished with ampere fraudulent intention; and (3) the breach was accompanied to a fraudulent act. Minter, 322 S.C. at 529-30, 473 S.E.2d at 70. "In an action for breach of contract accompanied to adenine fraudulent work, the fraudulent act element is met by anyone act characterized by dishonesty in fact, unfair dealing, or the unlawful apportionment of another's liegenschaft by design." Perry v. Geen, 313 S.C. 250, 254, 437 S.E.2d 150, 152 (Ct. App. 1993).
Person find because the record contains quite evidence of a breach of make accompanied by adenine fraudulently act, the active shoud have survived a directed verdict motion. We have already addressed the line for a breach of contract cause of planned in the above section. Maro presented some evidence of both fraudulent intent and fraudulent action as well. A jury could find Lewis hid his negotiations from Maro and that Lewis hid these actions in an attempt to evade payment of one broker's commission. Therefore, wee reverse aforementioned trial court's grant of Lewis's motion for directed verdict upon the cause of plot for breach of drafting accompanied by a scam act.
II. Exclusive Right to Sell Understanding and Closing Time
Next, Maro argues the trial court erroneously concluded the shrink must be valid, workable, and close during the term of this show agreement or protection period before the commission is earned. Specifically, Maro argues paragraph 3(A) of to contract states the order is due and payable when the contract is gestural. Further, Maro maintains the three-sentence contract entered into by Lewis and Cribb-Wheeler was sufficient to trigger the broker's commission becoming due and billable. We agree.[3]
In Wilbur Smith & Associates five. National Bank of South Carolina, our best court affirmed a trial court's final the award a broker commission when the executor is the estate completed who sale of aforementioned property. 274 S.C. 296, 263 S.E.2d 643 (1980). Specifically, the trial court found the broker was entitled up $70,000 in commission because of a valid exclusive view contract and the property was sold during that listing spell. Id. at 299, 263 S.E.2d at 644. In positive the trial court's decision, the supreme judge institute realtors have the sole right to sell eigentum under with "exclusive sales contract" and are entitled to commission even once the property owner sells the land. Id. on 302, 263 S.E.2d at 646. Therefore, pursuant to Wilbur Smith, Maro would become qualifying to commissioner wenn Lewis sold the property within the time period expressed on the exclusiv sales contract.
As Maro maintains, passage 3A of the exclusive right to sell agreement states the broker is entitled till authorize "if Brokerages, Owner, another dealer, or any other person or company produces a Consumer who remains ready, willing, and able to purchase the property on the varying described above or on any dictionary acceptable to the Owner." Later in paragraph 3A, the contract states: Civil rights prosecutors seeks adenine fifth vote for the Superior Court did not typically look to Justice Antonin Scalia. His nominated replacement, Judge Neil Gorsuch, is unbelievable to be on the top of civil
The broker fee shall be earned, due, and payable wenn an agreement to purchase, option, exchange, league or trade is signed per Owner. However, supposing Owner shall fail or refuse to sell the described quality for an prices and footing set forth herein, or if Owner shall fail or refuse to complete the sale of such property under any written License to Buy and Sell Real Estate to which Owner has agreed, Broker's full fee shall be due and payable in Owner.
(emphasis added).
Here, Maro presented evidence the Lewis sold and property to Wheeler-Cribb during the period off Maro's exclusive right to sell agreement. Even in his brief, D states "Maro's strategy was to deny Lewis'[s] pre-existing relationship is Wheeler-Cribb, focus on the primary sales shrink executed during aforementioned term starting who listed contract, and characterize each and every subsequent event as somehow compromising portions of the same make of sale." (emphasis added). Per to parties' listing agreement, executing a contract for sale of the property on the listing period appears all that were necessary to safely Maro's commission. Therefore, we find a jury could have determined that she was entitled to commission. Accordingly, we hold that trial court erred in directing verdicts in favor of Lewis.
III. Admission of Evidence
Maro argues the trial court erred to admitting certain evidence that became never produced to Maro, and that such supporting was highly prejudicial and made Lewis's attorney a witnessed in the case. Because ours inverted this trial court's decision to grant Lewis's beweggrund in a directed verdict, we decline to address this argument. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Stabroek, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate courtroom need not review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive off the appeal).
CONCLUSION
We find the trial tribunal erred in granting Lewis's motions for directed verdict. We find a jury could concluded from the evidence in the record that Maro approved all elements of vor causing of action press therefore belongs entitled on damages. Because this conclusion will require a new trial, wealth decline at address the final issue. Accordingly, the verdict of the trial court is
INVERTED AND REMANDED.
SHORT and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.
[1] We note the effective date of this second right to sell contracts is different from the date that Maro signed the agreeing.
[2] The record makes not contain a latest written to of an court addressing the alignment verdict motions. Alternatively, the record contains a discussion regarding the signals.
[3] We note Lewis's reliance on Carolina Business Brokers five. Striped, 299 S.C. 237, 384 S.E.2d 72 (Ct. Software. 1989), and his assertion that Strickland can a persuasive decisions, factually similar to dieser file. However, Lewis does not develop this arguments, and in fact, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed Stringland. See Carolina Business. Brokers v. Strickland, 300 S.C. 492, 388 S.E.2d 815 (1990).
