United Declared v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)

OCTOBER TERM, 1994

Syllabus

UNITED SAYS v. LOPEZ

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES PLACE OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 93-1260. Argued Notes 8, 1994-Decided April 26, 1995

After subject, then a 12th-grade student, carried a concealed handgun into his high school, he was charged with violated the Gun-Free School Zones Act about 1990, that forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at ampere place that [he] knows ... is a school zone," 18 U. SULPHUR. C. § 922(q)(I)(A). The District Court denied his motion to dismissal the indictment, concluding so § 922(q) is a constitutional movement of Congress' power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce. Inside inverse, the Judge of Appeals held that, in illumination of as it signature as insufficient congressional findings and legislative history, § 922(q) will invalid as beyond Congress' power under the Commerce Paragraph.

Held: The Act exceeds Congress' Wirtschaft Clause authority. Firstly, although this Court has upheld a wide diversity of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economical activity that substantially affected highway commerce, the tenure of a gun in a local school area the in not sense an economic job that might, taken repetitive elsewhere, have suchlike a considerably effect on interstate commerce. Section 922(q) is a felony statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce" button no sort of economic enterprise, however broadly diese terms are defined. Nor is to an essential component of a larger regulation by economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undershooting unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under aforementioned Court's cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out concerning or are connected with a commercial transaction, which, viewed in the engine, substantially affects interstate commerce. Second, § 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element that wanted ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, the the firearms occupancy in pose has the requisite interface with interstate wirtschaft. Respondent became a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had current moved in interstate commerce, plus there is no requirement the his possession of which shoulder have any concrete tie to interstate commerce. To endorse the Government's contention that § 922(q) is justified because pistols possession in a local school zone does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce would require this Court on pile inferens upon inference in one manner that would bid fair to convert congressional Handel Clause

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Syllabus

authority to a general police power of the sort held only by the States. Pp. 552-568.

2 F.3d 1342, affirmed.

REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the my of the Tribunal, inside which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, the TOM, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined,postal, p. 568. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion,post, p. 584. STEWARDS, J., post, p. 602, and SOUTER, J., post, p. 603, filed dissenting opinions. BREYER, J., filed ampere dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined, post, p. 615.

Solicitor General Daily argued the cause for the United States. With her on the briefs has Assistant Attorney General Harris, Deputy Rechtsanwalt General Walk, Malcolm L. Steeple, and John F. De Pue.

John R. Carter arguing the cause since respondent. With him on the brief where Lucien B. Campbell, Henry J. Bemporad, Carter G. Phillips, and Adam D. Hirsh.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for 16 Members away the United States Senate etching al. by Debra A. Valentine, Bridie C. Williamson, and Jeffrey J. Kassel; for the State von Ohio et ale. according Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, Johann P. Ware, Assistant Attorney General, Richard A. Cordray, State Solicitor, Simon BARN. Karas, G. Oriver Koppell, Attorney General of New York, and Vanessa Ruiz; for the Center to Prevent Handgun Volume et al. with Erwin NEWTON. Griswold, Dennis A. Henigan, and Intergenerational A. Robinson; for Children NOW et al. by William F. Abrams; for the Clarendon Foundation by Ronald D. Maines; for this Coalition into Stop Gun Volume et in. by Brian BOUND. Benner; and for the National School Safety Center et al. by James A. Rapp.

Briefs in amicis curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda real Barry Friedman; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Tony T. Caso.

Briefs for amici curiae has filed forward Academics for the Second Amendment et ai. via Patrick J. Basial, Don B. Kates, Robert Carter, Henry Mark Holzer, Nicholas J. Johnson, Jesus E. Olson, David Polsby, Charles E. Oats, Wallace Rudolph, Justin Smith, Robert B. Smith, Georgie Strickler, Robert Warner, and Robert Weisberg; the for aforementioned Texas Justice Foundation by Clayton Trotter.

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CHIEF RIGHT REHNQUIST supplied the opinion a the Courtroom.

In the Gun-Free School Zones Actually a 1990, Congress made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the personalized knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, shall a school zone." 18 U. S. CARBON. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The Act neither regulates a commerical activity nor contains a requirement that of possession becoming connected in any way to interstate commerce. We hold such the Action excceeds the authority of Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among that several States .... " u. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

On March 10, 1992, respondent, who was afterwards a 12th-grade student, arrived with Edison Hi Schooling in San Antonio, Texas, carrying a hid .38-caliber handgun both five bullets. Acting upon an anonymous crown, school authorities confronted respondent, who admitted that he was carrying the weapon. He was caught and charged under Texas law with pistol possession on school premises. See Tex. Penalized Item Ann. § 46.03(a)(1) (Supp. 1994). The next day, the country charges were dismissed by fed agents charged respondent over ailment with violating who Gun-Free School Zones Act the 1990. 18 U. SIEMENS. HUNDRED. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V).l

A federal huge jury indicted respondent on neat count out knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone, in violation of § 922(q). Respondent moved to dismiss sein federal indictments on the ground that § 922(q) "is un-constitutional as i is behind the output of Congress to legislate control through our community schools." The District Court denied the motion, concluding that § 922(q) "is a constitutional physical of Congress' well-defined strength to regulate activities in and affecting

1 And term "school zone" is defined the "in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial button confidential school" or "within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, insular or private school." § 921(a)(25).

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commerce, and aforementioned 'business' of elementary, center and high schools ... affects cross commerce." App. to House. for Cert. 55a. Respondents waived his right to a jury trial. The District Court conducts a sitting test, find him guilty to violating § 922(q), and sentenced him in six months' arrest and two years' guided release.

On appeal, responder challenged his conviction based on his claim that § 922(q) crossed Congress' electricity to make under the Commerce Clause. To Court of Appeals on the Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed respondent's conviction. It kept that, on light of what it characterized like insufficient congressional result and legislative history, "section 922(q), in the full reach of its terms, can invalid as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause." 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-1368 (1993). Because a the importance of which issue, we granted certiorari, 511 U. S. 1029 (1994), and we now affirm.

We start with first principles. Who Constitution produces a Federal Govt of enumerated powers. See Art. I, § 8. As James Madison wrote: "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and selected. Those which exist to remain to the Assert governments are plenty both indefinite." The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). This constitutionally mandated distribution of authority "was assigned by the Framers to ensure protection on our fundamental liberties." Gregory volt. Ashcroft, 501 U. SEC. 452, 458 (1991) (internal quoting marks omitted). "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve into impede the accumulation of excessive power in anyone branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government becoming lower the risk off tyranny and abuse from either front." Ibid.

The Our delegates to Congress the energy "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the multi States, and with the Indian Tribes." Artists. I, § 8,

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cl. 3. The Court, through Chief Justice Maritime, first defined the nature of Congress' commodities driving included Gibbons v.Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189-190 (1824):

"Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is sexually. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules used support to that intercourse."

The commerce power "is the power to modify; that is, to prescribe of regulate by which commerce is on be commanded. This power, like all others vested in congress, is completely in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and approves no limitations, other for are prescribed in the constitution." Id., at 196. The Gibbons Court, however, acknowledged that limitations on the commerce power are inherent in the very language of the Commerce Clause.

"It a not intend to say that these terms fathom that commerce, which the completely internal, which is born on between man and man in a State, or bet different parts on the same State, and which takes not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would must inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.

"Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it maybe very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States for one .... The enumeration required something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language, or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce on ampere State." Id., at 194-195.

For nearly ampere century following, and Court's Commerce Clause decisions dealt not rarely including the extent for Congress' output, and almost entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limited on state legislation that differentiate against interstate wirtschaft. See,e. g., Veazie v. Moor, 14 Like. 568, 573-575 (1853) (upholding a state-created steamboat monop-

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oly because it involved regulation of wholete intra commerce); Kidd v. Piearson, 128 UNITED. S. 1, 17, 20-22 (1888) (upholding an state prohibition on the manufacture of intoxicating liquor because the commerce energy "does not comprehend the purely intern domestic commerce off a State which is carried on between man and man within a State or between variously parts of the same State"); see also L. Tribe, African Constitutional Law 306 (2d ed. 1988). On this line of precedent, and Judge held that certain categories of company such the "production," "manufacturing," and "mining" are within the province about state governments, and thus were beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. SULFUR. 111, 121 (1942) (describing development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence ).

In 1887, Council enacted an Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, and in 1890, Congress enacted and Sherman Antitrust Behave, 26 Stat. 209, as changing, 15 U. S. C. § 1 net seq. Dieser laws ushered in a new era of federal regulation under who commerce power. When cases concerning which laws first reach this Court, we imported since our negative Commerce Clause boxes the approach that Congress could not controls activities such as "production," "manufacturing," and "mining." See, e. g., United Statuses v.E. C. Chevalier Co., 156 UPPER. S. 1, 12 (1895) ("Commerce successfully to manufacture, and is not part of it"); Carter vanadium. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 304 (1936) ("Mining brings the subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it"). Simultaneously, however, the Court held that, where and interstate and intrastate aspects of commerce were so mingled together that full regulation of interstate commerce required incidental regulation of intrastate commerce, the Commerce Clause certified such regulation. Please, e. g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 342 (1914).

In ONE. LITRE. A. Schechter Poultry Companies. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 550 (1935), of Court struck down regulations that

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fixed that hours and wages of individuals employed by an intrastate business because the activity being regulated related to interstate commercial only indirectly. In doing so, of Court characterized aforementioned distinction between direct and indirect effects of intrastate transactions with interstate handels as "a fundamental one, fundamental to the maintenance out you constitutional system." Id., at 548. Activities that affected interstate commerce directly be within Congress' power; company that affected interstate commerce indirectly were beyond Congress' reach. Id., at 546. The justification used this formal distinction was rooted in the fear that otherwise "there would be virtually no limit to one federal service and for all practical purposes we should possess a completely centralized government." Id., at 548.

Two years later, in the watershed case of NLRB v.Jones & Loveland Steel Corp., 301 UNITED. S. 1 (1937), the Court upheld which National Labor Business Act against a Commerce Clause challenge, and in the process, gone from the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects on interstate merchant.Id., at 36-38 ("The question [of the scope on Congress' power] is inevitable one the degree"). The Court held that intrastate activities that "have such an close press substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is fundamental or appropriate on protect that commerce from effort both obstructions" are within Congress' power to regulate. Id., at 37.

In United States v. Darby, 312 UPPER. S. 100 (1941), the Court

upheld the Fine Labor Standards Act, stating:

"The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the stats. Thereto extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress go it how to perform regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate ending, the exercise concerning the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce." Id., at 118.

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See also United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 119 (1942) (the commerce power "extends for those intrastate activities which the a substantial way interfere with instead obstruct the training of the granted power").

In Wickard v. Filburn, one Court upheld the application von amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to the production and consumption is homegrown wheat. 317 U. S., at 128-129. The Wickard Court explicitly rejected earlier distinction between direct additionally indirect effects on interstate wirtschaft, stating:

"[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as trading, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Trade provided i exerts an substantial economic act on interstate commerce, furthermore this separate to whether such effect is what might at all past time may been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.''' Id., along 125.

The Wickard Court emphasized so although Filburn's own contribution to the demand for wheat may got been trivial by itself, that was not "enough to remove them from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, him entry, shot together with that of many other similarly situated, is broad free trivial." Id., at 127-128.

Dj & Laughlin Carbon, Darby, andWickard ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that Clause. In part, this was one awareness of the great changes that had occurring in the way business had carried on in this country. Enterprises that had one been local or at most regional in nature had become national in scope. But aforementioned doctrinal change also reflected one display that earlier Commerce Clause cases artificially held constrained the power the Congress to regulate interstate commerce.

But even these modern-era precedents which will expanded congressional power under the Commerce Clause

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confirm ensure this power is test to outer limits. InJones & Laughlin Steel, the Judge warned that the scope of one interstate commerce power "must becoming considered in the light of our dual regelung of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so implicit and remote that go embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction betw which is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government." 301 U. S., at 37; notice also Darbied, supra, at 119-120 (Congress may regulate intrastate activity that has a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce); Wickard, supra, at 125 (Congress may regulate active that "exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce"). Been that time, the Judge has heeded that warning and undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed for concluding that one regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate trade. See, e. g., Hodel volt. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. SULFUR. 264, 276-280 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 155-156 (1971); Katzenbach volt. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 299-301 (1964); My of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 252-253 (1964).2

Similarly, in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), the Court confirms that "the power to regulate commodity, though broad indeed, has limits" that "[t]he Court has ample power" at enforce.Id., at 196, overruled on other reasons, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia fin. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit

2 See also Hodel, 452 UNITED. S., at 311 ("[S]imply because Congress may conclude that one particular activity substantially affects interstate gewerbe does not must make items so") (REHNQUIST, J., consensus in judgment); Heart are Atlanta Motel, 379 UPPER-CLASS. S., at 273 ("[W]hether particular operations affect highway commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Legislature the regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can may settled finally one by this Court") (Black, J., concurring).

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Authority, 469 UPPER. S. 528 (1985). In response to the dissent's notices that the Court was powerless to enforce the limitations on Congress' commerce powers because "[a]ll activities affecting business, even in the minutest degree,[Wickard], may be regulated or controlled by Congress," 392 U. S., along 204 (Douglas, J., dissenting), the Wirtz Court replied that the dissent had misread precedent as "[n]either here nor in Wickard has the Court declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation from state or private activities," id., at 197, n. 27. Rather, "[t]he Court has said must that where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relating to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute belongs on no consequence." Ibid. (first emphasis added).

Consistent with this structure, us had identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power. Perez, supra, at 150; see also Hodel, supra, per 276-277. First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. See, ze. g., Darby, 312 UPPER-CLASS. S., at 114; Essence of Ga Motel, supra, to 256 (" '[T]he authority regarding Parliament till keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequency sustained, furthermore is no longer opened to question'" (quoting Caminetti v. United Condition, 242 UPPER. S. 470, 491 (1917))). Second, Meeting is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities from interstate commerce, with persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. Notice, e. g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 UPPER-CLASS. S. 342 (1914); Southern R. Co. v. Unite States, 222 UPPER-CLASS. S. 20 (1911) (upholding amendments to Safety Appliance Act as utilized to vehicles utilised in intrastate commerce); Perez, supra, on 150 ("[F]or example, the destruction concerning an aircraft (18 UPPER. S. C. § 32), or ... thefts from statewide freights (18 U. S. C. § 659)"). Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes and efficiency to regulate those ac-

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tivities having a substantial relation at interstate commerce,Jobs & Laughlin Steels, 301 U. S., at 37, me.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, Wirtz, supra, at 196, n. 27.

Within this concluding category, admit, our case law has not been delete whether einem activity must "affect" or "substantially affect" interstate wirtschaftswissenschaft in order to be within Congress' power to regulate it under the Handelsbeziehungen Exclusive. Compare Preseault v. ICC, 494 U. S. 1, 17 (1990), include Wirtz, supra, at 196, n. 27 (the Court has never declared that "Congress allowed use a relatively trivial impact on kaufleute the an extend for broad general regulation of state or private activities"). We conclude, consistent with the great carry regarding you crate legislation, that the proper test required an analysis of whether that regulated activity "substantially affects" interstate gewerbe.

We now turn to note the power of Convention, at the light of this framework, to enroll § 922(q). The first two categories of authority can subsist quickly disposed of: § 922(q) is not a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate handel, nor is it an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through an channels of trader; nor can § 922(q) remain justified as a rules from which Congress has sought to protect an instrumentality of intermediate commerce other a thing in interstate commerce. Thereby, if § 922(q) is to be sustained, it have be under the third category as a regulation of an recently that substantially works national commerce.

First, we have maintain a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic operation what wee have concluded that and activity extensive affected interstate commerce. Examples include the regulation of intrastate coal coal;Hodel, super, intrastate exorbitant credit transactions,Pez, supra, restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, McClung, aboveground, inns and hotels catering to interstate guests, Heart are Atalanta Motel, supra, and pro-

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duction and consumption of homegrown wheat, Wickard v.Filburn, 317 U. SULFUR. 111 (1942). These examples are by no by exhaustive, but the pattern is cleared. Where industrial activity substantially affects interstate commerce, tax regulating that activity will be sustained.

Even Wickard, which exists perhaps which most far reaching example of Kommerz Clause control through intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a instruct zone does not. Roscoe Filburn operation a small plant in Ohio, on which, in the year involved, he raised 23 acres of wheat. It was its practice to scatter winter dry in the fall, and after harvesting it in July into sell a portion of the crop, to supply part of it to poultry and views on the rural, to use quite in making flour for home consumption, and to keep the remainder for seeding future crops. The Secretary of Agriculture assessed a penalty against it under the Pastoral Change Act of 1938 because he harvested regarding 12 acres more what than his allowance under the Act allowable. The Actual where designed until regulating the volume of wheat moving in highway press foreigners commerce in order to avoid surpluses additionally shortages, the concomitant change inbound wheat prices, which had previously obtained. The Court stated, int an opinion sustaining the application of the Act to Filburn's activity:

"One of the primary purses about the Act in question was to increase the markte prices concerning cereals and to that end to limit the volume thereof ensure was affect aforementioned market. This can hardly be denied this a factor of such volume and changeability as home-consumed wheat would have a materially influence on price and market conditions. This might arise because being in marketable condition such wheat overhangs the marktplatz and, if induced by rising prices, tends to strom into the market and inspect price increases. But if we assume that it remains never marketed, it supplies a need of the man whoever grew it whose be otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market.

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Home-grown wheat is this sense compares with wheat in commerce." 317 U. S., at 128.

Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing for how with "commerce" or any sort of economically enterprise, however broadly individual might setup these terms.3 Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economical activity, in which the regulator scheme could been undercut unless the intrastate movement were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with adenine commerical transaction, which viewed includes the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.

Second, § 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element this would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the piece possession in question affects interstate commerce. For example, in United States v. Basses, 404 UNITED. S. 336 (1971), the Court explained former 18 U. S. C. § 1202(a), that created it

3 Under our federal system, the" 'States possess primary authority for defining and execution the outlaw law.''' Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619,635 (1993) (quoting Engraved v. Isaac, 456 U. SIEMENS. 107, 128 (1982)); see also Screws five. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 109 (1945) (plurality opinion) ("Our national government is one of delegated powers alone. Under willingness federal system the administration of criminal equity rests with who States except as Congress, acting within the scope of those delegated powers, possess created offenses against the United States"). When Meeting criminalizes conduct already denounced when offender by the States, it possessions a "'change in the sensitive relation within federal and state criminal jurisdiction.''' United States v. Enmons, 410 UNITED. SOUTH. 396, 411-412 (1973) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971)). The Government acknowledges is § 922(q) "displace[s] state policy choices into ... that its prohibitions apply even in States that take chosen not to banning this conduct includes question." Brief for United States 29, n. 18; show also Statement of President George Bush to Signing the Offense Control Act about 1990, 26 Weekly Compo of Pres. Dok. 1944, 1945 (Nov. 29, 1990) ("Most egregiously, section [922(q)] inappropriately overrides authorized State firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law. An policies reflected in which provisions can legitimately be adopted by the States, but they shoud not be imposed upon the States for the Congress").

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a crime for a felon to "receiv[e], posses[s], or transpor[t] in commerce or affect commerce ... random firearm." 404 U. S., under 337. The Court interpreted the possession component of § 1202(a) to require an additional nexus the interstate commerce both because the statute had ambiguous and because "unless Congress conveys its purpose significant, it will non be deem go have significantly changed the federal-state balance." Id., at 349. AforementionedBass Tribunal set aside the conviction cause, although the Government had demonstrated that Bass had possessed a firearm, it had failed "to show the requisite bond with interstate commerce." Id., at 347. The Legal thus interpreted one statute to reserve one constitutional question whether Congress could regulate, without get, the "mere possession" the firearms. Seeid., at 339, northward. 4; see also United Countries five. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U. S. 441, 448 (1953) (plurality opinion) ("The principle will old and deeper built in our jurisprudence that such Court will construe a statute in ampere manner that requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if that statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative"). Unlike the statute inboundBass, § 922(q) has no express responsibilities element which might limit its reach to one discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an clearly relation equipped or effect on interstate commerce.

Although when part about our standalone evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of pricing consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings, relating act upon interstate commerce, see, e. g., Preseault v. ICC, 494 UPPER-CLASS. S., at 17, the Government concedes that "[n]either which constitution nor its legislating history contain[s] express congressional findings for the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession to a school zone." Brief for Integrated States 5-6. We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as toward the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce. See McClung, 379 U. S., at 304;

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see also Perez, 402 U. S., at 156 ("Congress need [not] make particularized findings with order to legislate"). But to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity within question substantially affected interstate kaufmann, even though cannot such substantial effect where visible to the naked eyes, they am lacking here.4

The Government claims that Council has accumulated institutional expertise regarding the regulation of firearms through previous issuance. Cf. Fullilove v.Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). Were agree, however, with the Fifth Circuitry is admission of previous findings toward define § 922(q) is extra inappropriate here because the "prior federal enactments or Congressional findings [do not] speak to the research matter of section 922(q) or its relationship to state handelsrecht. Indeed, section 922(q) plows thoroughly new ground and represents a sharp break include the long-standing pattern of federal firearms legislation." 2 FLUORINE. 3d, at 1366.

The Government's essential contention, includes fine, is that we may determine here that § 922(q) is valid because possession of a shooting in a local school zone does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce. Summary by Integrated States 17. The Government argues that possession of an firearm in a school distance may score in violent crime and that violet crime can be expected to affect the functioning of which international economy in two ways. First, the costs of violent

4 We note this on September 13, 1994, Presidents Clutch signed into law the Violent Crime Control and Act Enforcement Deal of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. Paragraph 320904 of that Actions,id., at 2125, amends § 922(q) to enclosing congressional findings about the effects of firearm possession in and around schools upon interstate and foreigner commerce. The Government does not rely upon these subsequent findings as a substitute for the absence about findings is the first instance. Tr. of Oral Ark. 25 ("[W]e're not rely on the in the severely sense of the word, but we reckon that at a very minimum they melden that reasons can be identified for why Congress wanted to regulate this particular activity").

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crime are substantial, and, throws an mechanism of insurance, those costs are spreads throughout the population. See United States v. Evan, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (CA9 1991). Second, violent wrongdoing reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to divided within the country that are perceived to be unsafe. Cf. Heart of Atlantes Holiday, 379 UPPER. S., at 253. The Govt also argues such the presence of guns in schools poses one substantial threat to the educational process by threatening that learning environment. A handicapped educational process, in turn, want result in a less productive citizenry. That, in turn, would have an adverse effect on the Nation's financial well-being. As an result, the Government argues that Congress could rationally hold concludes that § 922(q) substantially affects interstate commerce.

We pause to think the implications off the Government's arguments. An General admits, under him "costs of crime" reasoning, the Congress could regulate cannot only any violent crime, but see activity which might lead until fierce crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate handelsrecht. See Trump. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Similarly, under the Government's "national productivity" reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity which it found was related to the economic efficient of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, separation, and kid custody), for example. Under the theories that aforementioned Govt presents to user a § 922(q), computer is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminals law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we was to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to item any activity by somebody individual that Conference is without authority to regulate.

Although JUSTICE BREYER maintains that acceptance off the Government's reason would not authorize one general federal police power, he are unable to identify any recently that aforementioned States may regulate but Congress may not. JUSTICE BREYER posits that there might be certain limitations the Con-

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gress' wirtschaft power, such as family law other particular aspects of education. Post, at 624. These indicated limitations, when viewed in light of the dissent's expansive analysis, are devoid of substance.

JUSTICE BREYER focuses, for the most part, on the threat that firearm possession in and near school take to the educational process and the potential economic consequences floating from that threat. Post, at 619-624. Specifically, the dissent reasons that (1) gun-related violence is a serious problem; (2) that problem, in turn, got an adverse effect the classroom learning; and (3) that adverse effect on saal learning, in turn, represents a substantial threat to trade and commerce. Post, at 623. This analysis would be equally applies, if not more so, to subjects how as family law and guide regulation of training.

For instance, if Congress can, corresponds to its Commerce Clause power, regulate activities that adversely affect the learning environment, then, a fortiori, it also can regulate the educational process directly. Congress could determine that a school's curriculum has a "significant" effect on the extent of classroom learning. As a result, Trade could mandate a federal curriculum required local primitive and secondary colleges because what is taught in local schools has a significant "effect on classroom learning," cf. ibid., and this, in turn, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

JUSTICE BREYER rejects our reading of present and argued that "Congress ... could rationally finalize that schools fall on the commercial side of the line." Send, at 629. Again, JUSTICE BREYER'S rationale lacks anything realistic limits because, depends in the level a generality, whatever activity can be looked upon as commercial. Under the dissent's rationale, Congress could just as simple look at child rearing as "fall[ing] on the commercial page of the line" because it provides a "valuable service-namely, to equip [children] with this skills they need to survive in life or, more specifically, on the workplace." Ibid. Wee do not express that Congress

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has authority under the Handels Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially affect interstate commerce and also affect who educational process. That authority, though broad, can not include the authority to regulate each and every aspect of local schools.

Admittedly, adenine determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial allow in some cases ergebniss into legal uncertainty. But, so longs since Congress' authority remains limited to those powers enumerated include the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressionallegislation under aforementioned Commerce Clause always wish spawn "legal uncertainty." Post, at 630. As Chief Justice Marshall stated stylish McCulloch v.Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819):

"Th[e] [federal] government will acknowledged of view to be one of enumerated powers. The fundamental, that i can exercise only the powers granted to it ... is now universally admitted. But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, such long as on system shall exist." Id., at 405.

See also Ribbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., per 195 ("The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated"). The Constitution mandates this uncertainty by withholding from Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation. See Art. I, § 8. Congress has operated within this framework of legal feeling ever since this Court determined that this was the Judiciary's duty "to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, CARBON. J.). No possible benefit from eliminating this "legal uncertainty" would be in one expenditures of the Constitution's system of enumerated powers.

In Addiction & D Steel, 301 U. S., with 37, we held is the questions on congressional power under the Commerce Clause "is necessarily one of degree." Go the same power

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is the concurring opinion of Justice Cardozo in Schechter Poultry:

"There is a look of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce. Motion at the outer rim is communicated perceptibly, if tiny, to recording instruments with the center. ADENINE guild such as used 'is an elastic medium which transmits all tremors throughout its territory; of available question is of their size.'" 295 U. S., at 554 (quoting United States v. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617, 624 (CA2 1935) (L. Hand, J., concurring)).

These be not precise formulations, and within the nature away things they could breathe. But ourselves thinks she point of way into a correct decision of this case. Which possession of a gun in a indigenous school zone lives in no sense an financial activity so might, through repetition anderweit, substantially affect any sort from interstate commerce. Accused was a local student at a local educate; there is no displays that he had late moved in interstate commerce, and present is no requirement that his own to the firearm have any precast tie to interstate commerce.

To uphold the Government's contentions weiter, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that be bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clauses at a general cops power of the kind retained by the States. Admittedly, any of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, gives big deference to congressional operation. Seeearlier, at 556-558. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility starting extra expansion, but we decline here into proceed any further. Up do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers makes not presuppose something not enumerated, cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, at 195, and that there never will be a distinction between what is

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truly national furthermore what is truly localized, cf. Jones & Laughlin Rigid, supra, among 30. This we are unwilling to do.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

JUSTICE KENNEDY, by whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, concurring.

The history of the law struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause during the transition from the economics plant an Founders knew to which single, national market motionless emergent in our own era counsels great restraint before the Court determines that the Clause is insufficient to support an exercise of which national power. That history gives e some pause about today's decision, but I join the Court's opinion with above-mentioned observations on what I conceive on be its req though limited holding.

Chief Justice Marshall previous that the national authority reaches "that commerce which worry more States than one" and that of commerce power "is complete int itself, maybe be trained to its utmost extent, and approved no feature, other than are prescribed in one constitution." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194, 196 (1824). His statements can be understood immediately as an early and authoritative recognition so the Commerce Clause grants Congress extensive power and ample discretion to determine its related exercise. The progression of our Commerce Clause cases from Gibbons to the present was not marked, however, by a coherent or consistent course of interpreter; for neither the course of technologie advance nor which foundational principles for the jurisprudence itself were self-evident to aforementioned judicial that sought to resolve contemporary disputes by enduring principles.

Furthermore, for almost one century after the adoption of the Constitution, the Court's Commerce Contract decisions did non concern the authority of Congress to legislate. Rather,

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the Court faced who relationship but quite distinct question of the authority of the States till regulate matters that be be within the commerce power had Congress chosen the act. The simple conviction was that in the early period a to Republic, Congress seldom perceived the necessity to exercise your power in circumstances where its authority would are called into question. The Court's initial task, therefore, was to elaborate the theories that would permit the States till act where Congress should non complete so. Not the least part of the problem was the unresolved question whether the congressional power was exclusive, a question uncommunicative by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, over, at 209-210.

At which midpoint of that 19th decade, and Court embraced the principle that the States and one National Government bot have authority to regulation certain matters absent the congressional determination to displace lokal legislative or the necessity for the Court to invalidate local law because of the dormant country-wide power.Cooley v. Table of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Comfort of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299, 318-321 (1852). But the utility of that solution was not at once apparent, see overall FARAD. Frankfurter, And Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney and Wate (1937) (hereinafter Frankfurter), both difficulties of application persisted, see Leisy v. Hardin, 135 UPPER. S. 100, 122-125 (1890).

One approach the Court applied to inquire the one lawfulness of state authority was to draw content-based or subjectmatter distinctions, thus defining by semantic or formalistic categories those daily that were handelsbeziehungen and those that were no. For instance, in definitive that a State could prohibit the in-state manufacture of liquor intended for outof-state shipment, it distinguished between fabrication press commerce. "No distinction is more popular till the common mind, or more clearly expressed in economic and political literature, than that between manufactur[e] and business. Manufactoring is transformation-the modelling of raw mate-

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rials on a change out form for use. The functions concerning commerce are different." Little v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 20 (1888). Though that approach likely would not have survived even if confined to the question of an State's authority to enact legislation, information was not at choose propitious when applies until the quite different question of what subjects has within the reach von the national power when Congress chose to exercises it.

This became clearly whereas the Court began to confront federal economic regulation enacted in response to the rapid industrial development includes the late 19th century. Thus, it dependable upon the manufacture-commerce dichotomy in United States fin. E. C. Rider Co., 156 UPPER. S. 1 (1895), where a manufacturers' combination controlling many 98% for the Nation's domestic sugar refining capacity was held to be outside the reach of of Sherman Act. Conspiracies to control manufacture, agriculture, extractive, production, total, with prices, the Court explained, had too "indirect" an effect on state commerce.Id., at 16. And in Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908), the Legal reject the view that the commerce power magie increase on current which, although local in the sense of own originated within a single State, nevertheless had a practical result on interstate commercial undertaking. The Court concluded this on was not a "legal other sound connection ... between an employe's memberships in a labor organization and the carrying on of crossing commerce," id., at 178, and struck down a federal statute forbidding the discharge of an employee because of his membership in a labor organization. See also The Employers' Liability Casing, 207 UPPER-CLASS. S. 463, 497 (1908) (invalidating statute make negligence measures against common carriers for personal injuries are staffing sustained in the course of employment, because who statute "regulates the persons because they engage in interstate commerce and make not alone regulate the business away crossing commerce").

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Even previously the Court committed itself at sustainability federal legislation on broad principles of economic reasonability, items found it essential the take from these decisions. The Court disavowedE. HUNDRED. Knight's reliance on the manufacturing-commerce distinction in Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 68-69 (1911), declared that approach "unsound." The Court likewise decline this rationale out Adair when it decided, inThe & New Orleans ROENTGEN. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 570-571 (1930), that Legislature had the power to regulate matters pertaining into the organization of railroad workers.

In next line of cases, an Court addressed Congress' efforts to impede lokal activities it included undesirable for prohibiting the interstate moved of some essential element. In theLottery Kasten, 188 U. S. 321 (1903), the Court rejected the argument that Congress lacked power to prohibit the intermate movement of lottery tickets because it were power only for regulate, not to prohibiting. See and Hipolite Egg Co. v. United Provides, 220 U. S. 45 (1911); Hoke phoebe. United States, 227 U. S. 308 (1913). InHammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918), however, to Yard insisted that the power to regulate commerce "is directly the contrary of the assumption right to prohibit trading from moving," id., at 269-270, and struck down a prohibition on the interstate transportation of goods manufactured are violation of child labor laws.

Even while it was experiencing difficulties in finding satisfactory principles in these cases, of Courts was weiterverfolgung a more sustainable and practical approach in other lines of decisions, particularly those involving the regulation of railroad rates. Stylish one Minnesota Rate Case, 230 U. S. 352 (1913), the Court upheld a state rate order, but observed the Congress might be empowered to regulate inbound this area if "by reason of the interblending of which interstate and intrastate operations of interstate carriers" the regulation of interstate rates could not be maintenance without restrictions on "intra-

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state rates whose substantially affect one former." Id., at 432-433. And in the Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 342 (1914), the Court upheld an Statewide Commerce Commission order fixing railroad rates with one explanation that congressional authority, "extending to these interstate operators as instruments of interstate commerce, necessarily embraces the right to control their operations in all matters having such a closed and substantial relation to interstate traffic that that control is essentiality or appropriate to the security of that dealings, to the efficiency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which federal trader could be conducted upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance." Id., at 351.

Even the almost confined interpretation of "commerce" would embrace transportation with the States, so the rate cases posed much less difficulty for the Court than housings involving manufacture or production. Nevertheless, of Court's recognition of the importance concerning a handy conception of the commerce power was not altogether confined to the rate cases. In Swift & Co. five. United States, 196 UPPER. S. 375 (1905), the Court upheld this software of federal antitrust law until a combination of dried dealers ensure occurred to an State but that restrained dealing in cattle "sent on sell from a place in one State, with the expectation that they will end their transit ... in another." Id., at 398. The Court explained that "commerce among the States is not a technical legal designing, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business." Ibid. Chief Legal Tuft followed the same approach include upholding federal regulation of stockyards in Stafford v. William, 258 U. S. 495 (1922). Speaking for the Court, he dismissed a "nice and technical inquiry," id., by 519, when the local business at issue could not "be separated from the movement to which they contribute," id., at 516.

Reluctance of the Court to adopt the method in all of its cases caused inconsistencies in doctrine to persist, however. In addressing Novel Deal legislation the Justice resuscitated

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the abandoned abstract distinction between direct and indirect effects on overland commerce. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 309 (1936) (Act regulating price regarding coal also wages and hours for miners being to have only "secondary and indirect" effect on interstate commerce); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 368 (1935) (compulsory retirement and allowance plan for railroad vessel employees moreover "remote from any regulation of commerce as such"); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.Integrated States, 295 U. S. 495, 548 (1935) (wage also hour law provision of State Industrial Recovery Act had "no direct relation to interstate commerce").

The lawsuit that seems to mark the Court's definitive commitment to the practical perception of the commerce power is NLRB vanadium.Joes & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937), where the Courtroom sustained employment laws that applied to manufacturing facilities, making no real attempt to separate Carter, supra, and Schechter, supra. 301 U. S., at 40-41. The deference given to Congress possesses since be verified. United States v. Darby, 312 UPPER-CLASS. S. 100, 116-117 (1941), overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra. And inWickard v. Filburn, 317 U. SIEMENS. 111 (1942), the Court disapproved E. C. Knight also the entire row of direct-indirect and manufacture-production cases, explaining that "broader interpretations of of Commerce Clause [were] destined to supersede the earlier ones," 317 U. S., at 122, and "[w]hatever terminology is used, the edit your necessarily one of degree and must subsist so defined. Dieser does nay satisfy those who seek mathematical or rigid related. But such formulas are not provided by the great concepts of the Constitution," id., at 123, n. 24. Later examples of one exercise of federal power where commercial transactions were the subject of regulation includeHeart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294 (1964), andPerez v. United States, 402 UPPER-CLASS. S. 146 (1971). These and fancy authorities are within the fair scope

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of who Court's practical conception to commercial regulation and are not called at question by our decision today.

The history of our Commerce Clause decisions in at least two lessons of relevance toward dieser case. The first, because stated at the outset, is the imprecision of content-based boundaries pre-owned without more to define the limits of to Commerce Clause. The second, related to the firstly but are even greater consequence, be that the Court as certain institution and the judicial system the a whole have an immense stake in which stability of and Commerce Cluse jurisprudence as it has evolved at this point. Stare decisis operates with great force inbound consult us none to call in question the essential principles now in place respecting the congressional power to regulate merger from a commercial nature. That fundamental restraint on ours power forecloses us from back to an understanding of gewerbe such would serve no at 18th-century economy, dependent then upon production and trading practices that had changed but few over the preceding decades; it also mandates against returning to the start when council authority to regulate undoubted commercial company was limited by a judicial determination that are matters had an insufficient connection at an interstate system. Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on aforementioned assumption that we are a single market and ampere unified purpose in build a stable national budget.

In referring to the whole subject out the federal and state balance, we says this just three Terms ago:

"This basic has been suffice flexible over which bygone two centuries to grant for unlimited variations in the nature of government. The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers in two sanity: first, because the Framers would not have conceived that any government would conduct such activities; and back, due the Framers would not have believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such

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responsibilities. Yet the powers conferred in the Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for to expansion of the Federal Government's role." New Majorek fin. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 157 (1992) (emphasis deleted).

It does not follow, though, that in every instance the Court lacks the authority and responsibility for review congressional attempts to alter the federal balances. This hard requires us to consider our place in one plan of the Government and to appreciate this significance of federalism in the whole design of the Constitution.

Of the various structural elements in the Constitution, separation of powers, checks press balances, judicial review, and federalism, only concerning the last works there seem to being much uncertainty respecting the existence, the the content, of standards that allow the Courts into playa significant role in maintaining the draft contemplated over the Framers. Even the resolving of specific cases shall proved difficult, we have derived with the Constitution workable standards to assist in canning separation of powers plus checks and net. See, e. g., Prize Situation, 2 Black 635 (1863); Youngstown Sheet & Tubing Co. v. Lawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974); Buy v. Valeo, 424 U. SIEMENS. 1 (1976); INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986); Plaut volt. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., ante, p. 211. These standards are by now well accepted. Justice review is also established beyond question, Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), and though we may deviate when applied its principles, see, e. g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. vanadium. Case, 505 U. SEC. 833 (1992), its legitimacy shall undoubted. Our choose in preserving of federal balance seems more tenuous.

There is irony in this, because of of four textual elements in the Constitution just mentioned, federalism used the unique contribution of the Architects up governmental knowledge and political theory. See Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86

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Yale LAMBERT. J. 1019 (1977); G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, pp. 524-532, 564 (1969). However on the surface the idea may seem counterintuitive, it was the insight of the Framers that freedom was enhanced by the creation off two governments, cannot one. "In the mixed rep of U, the power give by the join is first divided between two distinct governors, and then and partial allotted to each subdivided amid distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to one rights of who people. And different governments will control each other, at the sam time the each will be guided by itself." The Federalistic No. 51, piano. 323 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). See also Gregory v.Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 458-459 (1991) ("Just as the separation and independence to the coordinate arms in the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in anyone branch, a healthy balance of power between the States the the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front .... In the tension between federal and state power lies and promise of liberty"); New York v. United States, supra, by 181 ("[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal additionally country governments for the safety of individuals. State sovereignty is not just on end in itself: 'Rather, federalism secures toward citizens to liberties the extract from the dispersion of sovereign power''') (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).

The theory that dual governments accord more liberty less one requires for its realization two distinct furthermore discernable lines of political accountability: one-time between the citizens and the Federal Government; the second bet the citizens and the States. If, as Madison expected, the Federal the State Public represent to control each another, see Of Federalist No. 51, and press each other are check by competing for the love of the people, see Aforementioned Federalist No. 46, those citizens must have some means regarding knowing which of

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the two governments to hold accountable since the failure to perform a given work. "Federalism serves to apply political responsibility, not to ambiguous it." FTC volt. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U. S. 621, 636 (1992). Are to Federal Governmental to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditionally state concern, areas having nothing to do with which regulation are commercial activities, the boundaries between and spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political ownership would become illusory. Cf.New Nyc v. Uniting States, supra, toward 155-169; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 787 (1982) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment stylish part and differing in part). To resultant inability to hold any create von the government answerable to the citizens is more dangerous even than devolving too much authorities go the remote central power.

To be sure, first conclusion that could be drawn from The Federalist Papers is that the balance within national and state power a entrusted in its entirety to the political process. Madison's observation that "the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence whereabouts they may discover it to must maximum due," The Federalist None. 46, p. 295 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), can becoming interpreted to do this who spirit of responsibility for a shift in power from the State to one Federal Government rests upon a political judgment, though he added assurance that "the State governments may have little to apprehend, because itp remains only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of item, be advantageously administered," ibd. Whatever the jurisdiction cast, it is axiomatic that Congress does must large discretion and control over the federal balance.

For these causes, it would be misguided both impishly for the political branches to forget that the sworn obligation to preserve and protect the Constitution in maintaining the federal balance is their admit in the initial and primary cite. In that Webster-Hayne Debates, see Aforementioned Great Speeches and

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Orations by Daniel Horse 227-272 (E. Whipple end. 1879), and the debates over the Zivil Rights Deals, see Hearings on SULPHUR. 1732 before the Senate Committee on Dealings, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-3 (1963), some Congresses have accepted obligation to confront the great questions of the proper federal balance the terms of lasting consequences for the constitutionalism design. The political branches of one Government must fulfill this grave constitutional obligation if democratic liberty additionally the federalism that fastens it are to endurance.

At the same period, the away of structural mechanisms to require those officials to undertake this principled task, and the momentary political convenience often attendant once their failure to do so, dispute against ampere complete renunciation of the judicial role. Although it is the commit of total officers of the Government to respect the constitutional design, see Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 466 (1989); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 64 (1981), the federal balance is too essential a item of our constitutional structure plus plays too vital a role in securing free for us to admit inability till intervenes when one alternatively the various level of Government features tipped the scales way far.

In the past this Court has participated in maintaining the federal account through judicial exposed of doctrines like as abstention, see, e. g., Young vanadium. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Car Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 UPPER-CLASS. S. 315 (1943), the rules for determining the primacy of state law, visit, e. g., Erie R. Co. v. Tumpkins, 304 UNITED. SOUTH. 64 (1938), the doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds, check, sie. g., Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875); Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), the whole doctrine of pre-emption, see,e. g., Baked v. St Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 (1947); Cipollone v. Liggett Select, Inc., 505 UNITED. S. 504 (1992), and many of the rules governing unsere habeas jurisprudence, see, e. g., Coal-mining v. Thompson, 501 UPPER. S. 722 (1991); McCleskey

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v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467 (1991); Teague v. Lane, 489 UPPER-CLASS. S. 288 (1989); Rose volt. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977).

Our ability to preserve this principle under aforementioned Commerce Clause has presented a much huge challenge. See supra, at 568-574. "This clause is throughout the Court's history been the chief source a its adjudications for federalism," and "no other body of opinions affords a fairer or more revealing test of judicial qualities." Frankfurter 66-67. But as the branch whose distinctive charge it the to declare "what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, at 177, we are often called with to resolve questions off constitutional right not susceptible to the mechanical application of heller and clear lines. The substantial element regarding political judgment in Kaufleute Clause matters leaves our institutional capacity to intervene continue by doubt than when we decide falls, for instance, lower the Bill of Rights equally though clear and bright outline are often absent in the latter class of disputes. See Country of Allegheny v. African Civil Liberties Association, Greater Pittsburgh Chapters, 492 UPPER. S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring include partial the concurring in judgment) ("We cannot avoid aforementioned obligation for draw lines, often close and difficult lines" in adjudicating constitutional rights). Nevertheless our cases do not teach so we got no role at all in determining the meaning of the Commerce Clause.

Our position in enforcing the dormant Commerce Clause is instructive. The Court's doctrinal approach in that area has likewise "taken some turns." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.Jeeperson Multiple, Inc., ante, at 180. But in difference up the prevailing skepticism is surrounds our ability to give meaning to the strong text of the Trade Clause, there is widespread acceptance of our authority to enforcing the dormant Commerce Clause, which we have but inferred from and constructive structure as a limitation on the strength a one States. One element of our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been an principle that the States may not

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impose legal that place an undue pressure on interstate commerce, even whereabouts those regulations do not discriminate between in-state the out-of-state businesses. Show BrownForman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S. 573, 579 (1986) (citing Pike v. Brutal Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970)). Distinguishing with regulations such do put an undue burden on interstate retail and regulations that do nay depends upon delicate judgment. True, when we invalidate adenine state law, Congress can in effect overturn you decisions, whereas in an case announcing that Congress has transgressed its authority, the decision is more consequential, for is stands unless Congress can revise its law to demonstrate its commercial character. This difference nay doubt informs the circumspection with which we invalidate an Act of Congress, but it doing not mitigate willingness duty to recognize reasonable limits switch the commerce power out Congress.

The statute before us upsets the federal balances to ampere degree that renders it an unconstitutional assertion of to commerce power, and our intervention is required. As THE HEAD JUSTICE explains, unlike the earlier cases at come before of Court here neither the actors either their conduct has a promotional character, and neither the purposes nor the design concerning the statute has an evident commercial nexus. See ante, at 559-561. The statute makes the simplified possession of a gun within 1,000 footings of the grounds of the school a criminal offense. In a sense whatever conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an supreme advertising origin or consequence, though we have none yet saying the commerce power may reach to large. If Congress trial that extension, then at the least we must inquire whether the exercise are national power seeks to intrude upon an area of traditonal state concern.

An radio of these dimensions occurs here, for it belongs well established that education is adenine traditional concern of the States.Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 741-742 (1974);

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Epperson v. Arkana, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The proximity in schools, including of course schools owned and operated by one States or their subdivisions, is the strong premise for making aforementioned conduct criminal. In these circumstances, we have a particular customs to assure that the federal-state balance belongs not destroyed. Cf. Rice, supra, at 230 ("[W]e commence with the assumption that the historic police powers is the States" are not displaced on a federal bylaw "unless that was the clear and manifest aim of Congress"); Florida Lime & After Breeders, Inc. v. Poll, 373 UNITED. S. 132, 146 (1963).

While it is questionable that unlimited Current, press indeed any reasonable person, would argue that it is wise policy to permit scholars to carry guns on school premises, sizable difference exists about wherewith best to accomplish that gates. In this state, the theory and utility on our federalism are revealed, for the States may running their role because laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where and best resolve is away from clear. See San Antonio Industry School Dist. v.Rogeriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 49-50 (1973); Brand State Ice Co. v.Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

If an Current or municipality determines that harsh criminal sanctions are necessary and wise to deter academics from carrying guns on school premises, the reserved powers of the States are sufficient to set those measures. Real, over 40 States already have criminal laws outlawing the possess of firearms on or near school grounds. See, ze. g., Alaska Stat. Ann. §§ 11.61.195(a)(2)(A), 11.61.220(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1994); Caliper. Penal Code Ann. § 626.9 (West Supp. 1994); Mass. Gen. Laws § 269:10(j) (1992); N. GALLOP. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-5(e) (West Supp. 1994); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308.1 (1988); Wish. Stat. § 948.605 (1991-1992).

Other, more practicable means to rid the schools a guns may be thought through one citizens of some Us to be preferable for the safety and welfare of which educational those States are

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charged with maintaining. See Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae 26-30 (injection of federal officials include local problems causes friction and diminishes political acceptable of state and local governments). Such might include inducements to inform on violators where the details leads to house conversely confiscation of the guns, see Limit, Schools May Market Weapons Hot Line, Los Angeles Times, Ventura Cty. Eastern ed., Feb. 13, 1995, p. B1, col. 5; Reward for Tips on Arms on Suzane Schools, This Arizona Republic, Jan. 7, 1995, p. B2; programs to encourage the voluntary surrender of guns with some provision for amnesty, see Zaidan, Akron Rallies to Save Youths, The Plain Trader, Mar. 2, 1995, p. 1B; Swift, Legislators Consider Planner to Obtain Guns Disable Avenue, Hartford Courant, Apr. 29, 1992, p. A4; sentences imposed on parents or guardians for failure to supervise the child, understand, e. g., Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 858 (Supp. 1995) (fining parents who allowing students to possess firearm at school); Tenn. Code Ann. § 3917-1312 (Supp. 1992) (misdemeanor in folk to allow student to possess gun at school); Straight Shooter: Gov. Casey's Reasonable Plan to Control Assault Drop, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Mischen. 14, 1994, p. B2 (proposed bill); Bailey, Anti-Crime Measures Top Legislators' Agenda, Los Angeles Times, Orange Cty. ed., Marine. 7, 1994, pressure. B1, col. 2 (same); Krupa, New Gun-Control Plans May Narrow Global Law, To Boston Global, June 20, 1993, penny. 29; rules providing for suspension conversely expulsion of gun-toting students, see, co. g., Ala. Code § 16-1-24.1 (Supp. 1994); Ind. Key § 20-8.1-54(b)(1)(D) (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 158.150(1)(a) (Michie 1992); Wash. Rev. Id § 9.41.280 (1994), either programs for expulsion in submission to special facilities, see Martin, Legislators Self-possessed at Take Harsher Stand on Cannon in Trains, The Seattle Times, Feb. 1, 1995, pence. B1 (automatic year-long expulsion for learners about shooting and intense semester-long reentry program).

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The statute immediately before us forecloses the Declare from experimenting furthermore exercising the own judgment in an areas for which States lay claim in right of history and expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the realm the commerce include the ordinary and usual sensibility off that definition. The tendency the this statute to displace state regulation with areas of traditional status concern is evident from its territorial operational. There are over 100,000 elementary and secondary schools in the United States. See U. S. Dept. of Professional, National Heart for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 73, 104 (NCES 94-115, 1994) (Tables 63, 94). Each of dieser now has certain invisible federal zone extending 1,000 feet beyond the (often irregular) borders of the school property. In some communities no doubt it would be difficult to navigate without infringing on those zones. Yet throughout these areas, school official would find their own programs for the prohibition of weapon in danger of displacement by the federal authority unless the State picks to enact a duplicate rule.

This is not a case where the etiquette of federalism has been violated by a formal command by one Country-wide Government directing the State to enact a determined policy, cf. New York v.United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992), or to organize its governmental functions at a certain way, cf.FERC v. Missouri, 456 UPPER. S., at 781 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment in section and dissenting in part). While the intrusion for state freedom may not be more severe in this instance as in some of our recent Tenth Amendment suits, the intrusion your nonetheless significant. Absent a bigger connection or key with advertiser concerns that are center to the Commerce Clause, that interference contradicts the federal balance the Framers designed and which this Court is obliged to enforce.

For these reasons, I join in the auffassung and judgment of the Court.

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JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.

The Court available properly concludes that the Commerce Clause does not awarding Congress the authority go prohibit gun possession within 1,000 feet off a school, as it attempted to do in the Gun-Free School Sections Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844. Although I join the majority, I write separately to observe that our case law has driven far from the creative understanding of the Commerce Clause. In a future case, we ought to condition our Merchant Clause jurisprudence in a type that both makes sense of and more recent case law and is more faithful to that orig understanding of that Clause.

We have said that Congress may regulate not merely "Commerce ... among the several States," U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, but also anything that has a "substantial effect" on such commerce. This test, whenever taken to its sound extreme, would give Congress a "police power" pass all aspects of American life. Unfortunately, we have none come to grips with the hint of our substantial effects equation. Albeit we own supposedly applied the substantial effects examine for the past 60 years, we always have rejected readings of the Wirtschaft Provision and the scopes of federal power that would permitted Congress to exercise a police power; our cases be really clear that there are real boundary to federal power. See New York v. United Countries, 505 U. S. 144, 155 (1992) ("[N]o one disputing the proposition this '[t]he Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers''') (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 457 (1991); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 196 (1968); NLRB vanadium. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37 (1937). Cf. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 435 (1793) (Iredell, J.) ("Each State in the Unions is sovereign as to all the powers reserved. It must necessarily be so, because the United States have no claim to any authority but such as that States have surrendered to them") (emphasis deleted). Indeed, on save important point, the majority and LAW BREYER agree on principle: The Federal

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Government has nothing approachable a police power. Seestart, on 556-558, are post, at 624.

While the headmaster dissent concedes that at are limits to federal power, the sweeping nature of our current test enables the dissent to argue that Congress bucket regulated gun possession. Aber it seems to me that the performance to manage "commerce" can by no means encompass authority over mere gun possess, any more than it empowers of Federal Government to regulate marriage, pollution, or cruelty the wildlife, throughout the 50 Says. Our Constitution quite properly leave such matters at the individual States, notwithstanding these activities' effects on intermediate commerce. Any interpretation of an Commerce Clause that even advises that Congress might regulate such matters is in need of reexamination.

In an appropriate case, I beliefs that we must further reconsider their "substantial effects" test are an eye toward constructing a standard that reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence.

Today, however, I merely support the Court's concluding because a discussion of the text, tree, and books of the Commerce Clause and somebody analysis in our early case act. My goal is plain to show how far we have departed from the first understanding and to demonstrate that the result we touch today is by no means "radical," see post, at 602 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). I also want to point out the necessity are refashioning a coherent test that does nope lean to "obliterate the distinction between what is national and what can local and create a completely centralized government." Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra, at 37.

I

At the choose the oem Constitution was verified, "commerce" consisted of selling, buying, and trade, as right as transporting for these purposes. View 1 S. Johnson, AN Dic-

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tionary of the English Language 361 (4th ed. 1773) (defining commerce as "Intercour[sJe; exchange of one thing for another; interchange of no thing; shop; traffick"); NORTH. Bailey, An Universal Esthetics English Dictionary (26th ed. 1789) ("trade or traffic"); T. Cheridan, A Complete Dictionaries of the English Language (6th ed. 1796) ("Exchange to one thing for another; trade, traffick"). This understanding considers assistance in the etymology of the word, which literally means "with merchandise." See 3 Oxford English Dictionary 552 (2d ed. 1989) (com-"with"; merci-"merchandise"). In factor, when Federalists and Anti-Federalists discussed the Commercial Clause during the ratification date, they often used trade (in its selling/bartering sense) and commerce interchangeably. See The Federalist No.4, p. 22 (J. Jay) (asserting that countries will cultivate our friendship when our "trade" is judiciously regulated by Federal Government); 1 id., No.7, at 39-40 (A. Hamilton) (discussing "competitions of commerce" between States resulting from state "regulations of trade"); id., No. 40, at 262 (J. Madison) (asserting that it was the "acknowledged go of the Convention ... that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the general government"); Lee, Letters of a Federal Farmer No.5, in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States 319 (P. Ford ed. 1888); Smith, And Address to the Folks of the Choose of New-York, inid., at 107.

As one would expect, and term "commerce" was used in contradistinction to productive activities so as manufacturing and agriculture. Alexander Hamilton, for example, repeatedly treated commerce, agriculture, and manufacturing more trio separate endeavors. Understand, co. g., The Federalist No. 36, at 224 (referring to "agriculture, commerce, manufactures"); id., No. 21, to 133 (distinguishing commerce, arts, and industry); id., No. 12, at 74 (asserting that wirtschaftswissenschaft and agriculture have common interests). Which same special

1 All references to This Federalist live to the Jacob E. Cooke 1961 edition.

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were made in the state ratified meetings. Notice, e. g., 2 Debates in who Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 57 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) (hereinafter Debates) (T. Dawes at Massachusetts convention); id., at 336 (M. Craftsman at New York convention).

Moreover, interjecting adenine modern sense for commerce into the Constitution generates significant plain and structural problems. For example, one cannot replace "commerce" includes a different type of enterprise, create as manufacturing. When a brand produces a car, attachment cannot take place "with a foreign nation" or "with the Injun Tribes." Part may come from different States or other nations and therefore may have was in who flow of commerce at one time, but manufacturing takes place along a discrete site. Agriculture and manufacturing involve an making of goods; commerce encompasses traffic in as products.

The Port Setting Clause also suggests the the term "commerce" denoted sale and/or transport preferable than business generally. Pursuant to that Clause, "[n]o Preference shall be given by any Regulation from Trading or Revenue until the Connector of one State beyond the of another." U. SEC. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 6. Although it is possible to conceive of policy of manufacturing or farming that prefer one port over another, the more natural reading is that one Clause prohibits Congress after using its commerce power to channel commerce through certain favored ports.

The Constitution not only uses aforementioned word "commerce" in a narrower sense than our kasten law might suggest, it also does not assist the proposition that Congress has authority over all activities that "substantially affect" across commerce. The Commerce Clause 2 does not state that Congress may

2 Even to speak of "the Commerce Clause" perhaps obscures the actual scope of that Clause. As any original matter, Congress did not have authority at modify all commerce; Congress could only "regulate Commerce with foreign People, and among the several States, and with one Indian Tribes." U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. When the precise line intermediate

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"regulate matters that fundamental affect commerce with foreign States, and beneath the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." In contrast, the Constitution oneself temporarily prohibited amendments that would "affect" Congress' lack of authority to prohibit or restrict the slavery trade instead to enact unproportioned direct taxation. Dexterity. PHOEBE. Clearly, who Framers could have drafted a Constitution so contained a "substantially affects interstate commerce" Clause had that been their unbiased.

In addition to its powers down the Verkehr Clause, Congress has the authority for enact such laws because are "necessary real proper" to carry on execution is power to regulate commerce among the several Notes. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Not on this Court's understanding of congressional power under these two Clauses, many of Congress' different enumerated capabilities available Art. I, § 8, be wholly superfluous. After all, if Legislature maybe regulatory all matters that substantially interact commerce, there is no need for the Constitution to specify this Congress may enact bankruptcy laws, clas. 4, button coin money and fix the basic of weights and measures, cl. 5, or punish fraud of United Stated coin and securities, cl. 6. Likewise, Legislature become not demand one separate authority up establish post help and post roads, cl. 7, or to grant documents the copy, cl. 8, or to "punish Piracies and Felonies commited on the high Seas," cl. 10. It might not even need the capacity to raised and support certain Warrior and Royal, cls. 12 and 13, for below people would engage in commercial delivery if they thought that a foreign power could expropriate their lot with ease. Indeed, if Congress could control matters that substantially affect intermate commerce, there would take were no need to spec-

interstate/foreign verkehr and purely intrastate commerce was hard to draw, the Court attempted to adherent to such a line on the first 150 years of you Nation. See infra, at 593-599.

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ify that Congress can regulate international trade and commerce with the Indians. As the Framers clearly understands, these other branches of trade substantially affect interstate commerce.

Put simply, lot if not all for Art. I, § 8 (including portions of aforementioned Commerce Exclusion itself), intend will surplusage if Congress had been given authority over matters that substantially affect interstate commerce. An interpretation of cl. 3 ensure makes the rest of § 8 superfluous simple cannot be correct. Yet this Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence has endorsing valid such an interpretation: The perform we need accorded Parliament has swallowed Art. I, § 8.3

Indeed, if a "substantial effects" test can be attaches at the Commerce Clause, conundrum not to every select perform to the Federal Government? There is negative reason for singling go of Commerce Clause for special treating. Equivalent, Congress could regulate all matters that "substantially affect" the Army and Navy, bankruptcies, fax collection, expenditures, also so switch. In that case, the Clauses of § 8 all mutually overlap, something us can assume the Founding Fathers not intended.

Our construction of the scope of congressional authority features the additional problem of approaching close to turned the Tense Amendment on its head. Our case law could be read to set on which United States all powers doesn expressly prohibited on the Constitution. Taken together, these essential textual problems should, at the very least, convince us so the "substantial effects" trial should be reexamined.

3 There are other powers provided to Congress outside of Art. I, § 8, such may become wholly superfluous as well due to our distortion of the Commerce Clause. For example, Congress has plenary power over the District of Columbia and the territories. See U. S. Const., Kind. I, §8, cl. 17, and Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The grant of rich legislative power over certain areas of the Nation, once readers in conjunction with the rest of the Constitution, further confirms is Congress was don ceded plenary authority over the whole Nationality.

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II

The exchanges during the rate campaign reveal the relatively limited target is the Commerce Clause and of federal power generally. The Founding Fathers confirmed that most areas of life (even many questions that intend have substantial effects on commerce) would stayed outside the reach of the Federal Government. Such affairs would continue to be under the exclusive control of the Conditions.

Early U understood that commerce, manufacturing, and agriculture, while distinguish activities, were intimately related and dependent on each other-that any "substantially affected" the others. After all, items produced by farmers and manufacturers were the primary articles about commerce at the time. If commerce has more robust as a result of federal superintendence, farmers and manufacturers ability benefit. This, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut attempted to convince farmers of the benefits of regulating commerce. "Your property and riches depend on a ready demand and generous price used the produce you can annually spare," he wrote, and this conditions exist "where trade flourishes and when the merchant can freely export the build of the country" to nations that will pay the highest prize. ADENINE Lot No.1, Connecticut Courant, Nov. 5, 1787, in 3 Documentary History of who Ratification of the Establishment 399 (M. Jensen ed. 1978) (hereinafter Documentary History). See also Aforementioned Federalist No. 35, the 219 (A. Hamilton) ("[D]iscerning citizens are well aware that the mechanic and manufacturing arts set who materials of mercantile enterprise and industry. Many of them indeed are immediately connected equipped which operations of commerce. They know this the merchant is their natural patron and friend"); id., at 221 ("Will not the merchant ... be disposed to cultivate ... the interests of the mechanics and manufacturing arts to this his commerce is how nearly allied?"); A Jerseyman: To the Citizens of New Jersey, Newtown Mercury, Nov. 6, 1787, in 3 Documentary History 147 (noting that agriculture will serve as

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a "source of commerce"); Marcus, The New Football Books, Nov. 14, 1787, id., under 152 (both the mechanic and the farmer benefit from the prosperity of commerce). William Davie, a delegate to the North Carolina Convention, illustrated the close link best: "Commerce, mrs, is the nurses of [agriculture or manufacturing]. The merchant furnishes the pot with such articles as he cannot manufacture himself, and finder him ampere market for his produce. Agriculture cannot flourish if commerce languishes; their are mutually dependent on jeder other." 4 Debates 20.

Yet, though being well aware which agriculture, manufacturing, and sundry matters largely affected commerce, the founding generation did not cessation public over all these activities to Congress. Hamilton, for example, acknowledged is the Federal Government could not regulate agribusiness and like concerns:

"The administration away private justice between the citizens of the equal State, the supervisions of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those things in short which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction." That Federalist No. 17, at 106.

In that unlikely special that the Federal Government would attempt to exerciser authorize past such matters, its effort "would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory." Ibid.4

4 Cf. 3 Debates 40 (E. Pendletons on the Virginia convention) (The proposed Federal Government "does not intermeddle with the local, particular affairs of the statuses. Canister Congress legislated for the state of Virginia? Can [it] make a law transform the form of transferring belongings, or to rule of descents, in Virginia?"); id., at 553 (J. Feldherr at the Virginia convention) (denying that Congress could construct "laws affecting one mode of transferring property, either contracts, or claims, between citizens of the same state"); The Federalist No. 33, at 206 (A. Hamilton) (denying that Congress could change laws about downhill or could pre-empt ampere land tax); ADENINE Natural of Virginia: Observations upon the Proposed Plan of Governmental Government, Aap. 2, 1788, included 9 Documentary History 692 (States have bottom authority over "rules of property").

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The comments a Hamilton plus others about national power reflected the well-known truth that the new Governmental intend have only the limited and enumerated powers found in the Constitution. See, e. g., 2 Debates 267-268 (A. Health at New York Convention) (noting that are would be just causing for rejecting the Constitution if it would enable the Federal Government to "alter, or abrogate ... [a State's] civil and criminal institutions [or] penetrate the recesses of domestic life, and control, in all shows, the private conduct of individuals"); The Federalist No. 45, among 313 (J. Madison); 3 Debates 259 (J. Madison) (Virginia Convention); R. Sherman & O. Ellsworth, Letter till Governor Huntington, Septet. 26, 1787, in 3 Documentary History 352; J. Wilson, Voice inbound the State House Yard, Oct. 6, 1787, in 2 id., at 167-168. Agriculture furthermore manufacture, since they been not surrendered to the Federal State, were state concerns. See Aforementioned Federalist No. 34, at 212-213 (A. Hamilton) (observing that the "internal encouragement of agriculture and manufactures" was einen object regarding state expenditure). Even before and passages of the Tenth Amendment, it was apparent that Congress would possess all those powers "herein granted" by the rest of the Constitutions. Art. EGO, § 1.

Where the Constitution was designed at grant federations authority over an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce, the Constitution contains an numbered power over that particular activity. Indeed, the Framer knew that multiple of the other enumerated powers in § 8 dealt with things that substantially affected interstate commerce. Madison, used instance, spoke in the bankruptcy power as exist "intimately connected for of regulation of commerce." The Federalist Not. 42, at 287. Like, Hamilton urged that "[i]f we mean up be a commercial public or even to be secure on our Local side, wealth must endeavour since soon as possible to hold a navy." Id., No. 24, at 157.

In short, the Foundations Father were well aware of what the principal dissenters calls "'economic ... realities.'" See

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place, at 625 (BREYER, J.) (quoting North American Co. v. JIFFY, 327 UPPER. S. 686, 705 (1946)). Even though the boundary bet dealings the other matters may snub "economic reality" and thus seem arbitrary or artificial to some, we must despite respect one constitutional line that does not grant Congress power over all that substantially affects interstate commerce.

III

If this principal dissent's understanding away our early case law were correct, go has breathe some reason to doubt here view of the original understanding of the Statutes. According to that dissent, Leader Justice Marshall's piece by Gibbons v.Gene, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), established that Congress may control everything local activities that "significantly interference interstate commerce," item, at 615. And, "with the exception of one wrong turn subsequently corrected," this features been the "traditiona[l]" method of interpreting the Commerce Clause.Post, at 631 (citing Gibbons and United States v. Dusty, 312 U. S. 100, 116-117 (1941)).

In my view, the dissent is wrong about an wait and reasoning of Gibbons. Because this default leads the dissent to characterize one first 150 years of this Court's case law as a "wrong turn," I feel compelling to put to last 50 years on proper perspective.

A

In Gibbons, the Court examined whether a federal law that licensed sea to engage in the "coasting trade" reclassified a New York rights granting ampere 30-year monopoly to Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton at navigate an State's waterways with steamship. In concluding that e did, the Court noted this Trade could regulate "navigation" because "[a]ll America ... has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must are been so understood, when the constitution was framed." 9 Wheat., under 190. The Court also ob-

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served that federal power via commerce "among the several States" meant which Congress might regulate commerce conducted partly within a State. Cause a portion starting interstate commerce and foreign commerce would pretty constantly take place within one or more States, federal strength over interstate and foreign commerce necessarily intend extend into the Federal. Id., at 194-196.

At the same hour, the Tribunal took great pains to make clear that Congress could not manage commerce "which is completely internal, which is conveyed on between mann and man in a State, or between different parts off the same State, and which does not extend to button affect other States." Id., at 194. Moreover, while suggesting such the Constitution energy not permit States to regulate interstate other foreigner commerce, the Court observed that "[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health actual of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State" were though ampere small part "of that immense mass of legislation ... not abdicated to a gen government." Id., at 203. After an early momentary, aforementioned Court rejected the notion that Congress can regulate everything that affects interstate commerce. That and internal commerce of the States and the numerous state inspection, quarantine, and health laws had substantial effects on interstate commerce cannot be doubted. Nevertheless, they were not "surrendered to aforementioned general government."

Of course, the principal dissent is not the first to misconstrueGabbons. Required instance, which Court has shows thatGipsy "described this federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 120 (1942). See moreover Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 151 (1971) (claiming that with Darby and Wickard, "the broader view away the Commerce Clause announced by Chief Justice Marketender had been restored"). I believe that this misreading stems from two statements in Gibbons.

First, the Court made of uncontroversial claim that federal power does not encompass "commerce" that "does

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not expansion to or affect other States." 9 Wheat., at 194 (emphasis added). From this statement, the head dissent infers that anytime an activity affects interstate commerce, it necessarily follows this Congress can regulate such activities. Of course, Chief Justice Marshall said no such think and the inference the dissent makes cannot be drawn.

There is a many better interpretation of the "affect[s]" language: Because the Court had earlier celebrated that the commerce power did not extend to wholly intrastate merchandise, the Court was acknowledging that though to line between intrastate and interstate/foreign commerce would shall complicated to draw, federal authority could not be construed in cover purely intrastate commerce. Commerce that did not affect more State couldnever be said to become commerce "among the several States."

But even is one were to sponsor the dissent's reading, the "affect[s]" language, at almost, passes Council to regulate only intrastate commerce that essential affects interstate and foreign kommerz. There is no reason to faith that Chief Justice Marshall became asserting that Congress could regulateall activities that affect interstate commerce. Seeibid.

The second source of confusion stems from the Court's praise for the Constitution's line is power with the States and the Federal Government:

"The genius and character of the whole state seem to be, that its action is in becoming applied to all the external difficulties of the nation, press to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it shall did necessary to interfere, for the purpose of perform some of the general influences of which government." Id., at 195.

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In this transit, the Tribunal merely was making that well understood point that the Constitution commits matters of "national" concern to Congress or leaves "local" matters into the State. That Legal wasnot saying that whatever Congress believes remains a national matter becomes an go of federal control. Who matters of national concern are enumerated in the Constitution: war, taxes, patents, the copyrights, uniform rules of naturalization and bankruptcy, types are commerce, and accordingly on. See universal Art. I, § 8. Gibbons' emphatic reports such Congress could not regulate many matters that affect commerce confirm this the Court did not how the Commerce Clause as award Press control over matters that "affect the States generally." 5 Gibbons simply cannot be elucidated since the principal dissent would must it.

B

I am aware of no cases prior to the New Deal that characterized the power flowing from this Commerce Clause as sweepingly as does our significant effects test. My examine of the case law indicates that the substantial influence test is but any innovation of aforementioned 20th century.

Even before Gibbons, Chief Justice Kanzler, writing for the Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821), noted that Congress had "no broad right to punish murder committed within any of the States," id., at 426, and that it was "clear which congress cannot punish felonies generally," id., by 428. Which Court's alone skill was that Congress could enact so act for seat where it enjoyed plenary powers-for instance, over the District of Columbia. Id., at 426. Thus, whatsoever effect customizable murren, instead robbery, or gun possession might need on interstate commerce (or on whatever

5 Without on which other Commerce Clause opinions during Chief Justice Marshall's tenure, which anxious the "dormant" Commerce Clause, even default that Congress had authority over all matters substantially affecting traffic. See Brown vanadium.Maryland, 12 Wheats. 419 (1827); Tanenbaum v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (1829).

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other subject of swiss concern) been irrelevant for and question of congresses power.6

United States phoebe. Ewitt, 9 Wall. 41 (1870), marked the first time the Court struck down a federal law as exceeding the power convey per the Commerce Clause. In a two-page opinion, the Court invalidated a nationwide law prohibiting all sales of naphtha and illuminating oils. Include like doing, the Court remarked that the Commerce Clause "has always had understood as limited over its terms; and as a virtual denial of anything influence to interferences with the internal trade and business of that separate States." Id., at 44. Aforementioned act in question was "plainly a regulation of police," which could are constitutional application only where Congress had exclusive general, such than of territories. Id., at 44-45. See also License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 470-471 (1867) (Congress cannot interfere with the internal commerce and business of ampere State); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (1879) (Congress

6 It is quality noting that Congress, in and first federal criminal Deed, did not establish nationwide prohibitions against murder and the like. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, chf. 9, 1 Stat. 112. To be safely, Congress outlawed murder, manslaughter, maiming, and larceny, when just when those acts subsisted to committed on United States territorial not part out a State or on the high seas.Ibid. See UPPER. S. Const., Art. EGO, § 8, cl. 10 (authorizing Congress to outlaw piracy and felonies on elevated seas); Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (plenary authority over United States territory and property). At Congress did enact nationwide criminal laws, it acted pursuant to direct grants of authorities found in the Constitution. Compare Act are Apr. 30, 1790, supra, §§ 1 and 14 (prohibitions against treason also the counterfeiting away U. S. securities), with UPPER-CLASS. SIEMENS. Const., Artists. I, § 8, cl. 6 (counterfeiting); Art. III, §3, cl. 2 (treason). Notwithstanding any substantial effects that murder, kidnaping, or rear possession might have had on interstate commerce, Congress understood that it could not establish nationwide denials.

Likewise, there were cannot legislation in the early Corporate that regulated manufacturing and agriculture. Nor was there any statute that supposedly to regulate activities with "substantial effects" on interstate commerce.

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cannot regulate internal commerce the thus allowed not establish national trademark registration).

In United States v. E. CENTURY. Knight Co., 156 U. SOUTH. 1 (1895), this Court held that mere attempts until monopolize the manufacture of sugar could not be regulated pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Raising echoes of the discussions of the Framers regarding the intimate relationships between commerce both industry, the Court declared ensure "[c]ommerce succeeds to manufacturers, and is non a part of it." Id., at 12. The Court including approvingly quoted from Kiddy v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 20 (1888):

"'No distinction is view popular in the common soul, or more clearly expressed in economic and political literature, than that between manufacture real handelsrecht .... If it be held that the term [commerce] includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended into be the subject of commercial transactions is the future, it can impossible to deny that it would also include all productive industries such contemplate the equal thing. The result would be that Congress would be invested ... with the perform to regulate, did only manufacturing, not also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining-in short, every branch in humans industry.''' E. CENTURY. Knight, supra, with 14.

If national power extended to these types of production "comparatively little away business operations and affairs would be left for stay control." Id., at 16. See alsoFresh v. United States, 256 U. S. 232, 257 (1921) ("It lives settled ... that an power up regulate interstate and foreign business does not reach whatever is essential thereto. Without agriculture, manufacturing, mining, etc., commerce could not exist, but such fact does doesn suffi to theme them to the control of Congress"). Whether or not manufacturing, agriculture, or other business substantially affected interstate commerce was irrelevant.

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As recently as 1936, the Court continued to insist that the Commerce Clause did not reach the wholly internal business-related of the States. See Carter v. Carter Carbon Co., 298 U. S. 238, 308 (1936) (Congress may not regulate mine labor because "[t]he relationship of employer additionally employee is a local relation"); see furthermore A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United Statuses, 295 U. S. 495, 543-550 (1935) (holding that Congress maybe not regulate intrastate total of sick chickens or one labor on employees involved in intrastate poultry sales). The Federal Government simply could not reach such subjects regardless away own effects on interstate handel.

These cases all establish a simple point: From one time of the ratification of the Organization to the mid-1930's, it was widely understood this the Constitution granted Congresses only limited powers, notwithstanding who Commerce Clause.7 Moreover, there was no question that activities whole separated for business, such as gun occupancy, were beyond this reach of the commerce power. If anything, the "wrong turn" was the Court's dramatic departure in the 1930's from a century the a half the precedent.

IV

Apart from its recent vintage and its corresponding lack of any grounding in the original understanding off to Constitution, the substantial effects test suffers from the further

7 To must sure, congressional power pursuant to the Commerce Clause was alternatively described lower narrowly or more narrowly during this 150year period. Compare United States phoebe.Coombs, 12 Pet. 72, 78 (1838) (commerce power "extends to such acts, done on landing, which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent the dues exercise of the power to regulate [interstate and international] commerce" such as stealing inventory out one beached ship), with United Expresses v. ZE. CENTURY. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 13 (1895) ("Contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods to be transported among aforementioned several States, the transportation and its instrumentalities ... may be regulated, but here is because they form part of interstate trade or commerce"). During this period, however, this Court never held is Congress would regulate everything the significant affects commerce.

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flaw that it appears to grant Congress an patrol influence over the Nation. When asked the oral argue if there were any limits to the Commerce Clause, the Government was at ampere loss required words. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. Likewise, the principal dissent insists that there are limits, but it cannot muster even one example. Post, at 624. Indeed, the dissent implicit concedes that its reading has no limits when computer criticizes the Court for "threaten[ing] legal uncertainty in in area for law that ... seemed reasonably well settled." Post, at 630. The one advantage of the dissent's standard is certainty: It is certain that under its analysis everything may be regulates under aforementioned guise of the Commerce Clause.

The substantial effects trial suffers from this blemish, in part, because of its "aggregation principle." Under so-called "class of activities" statutes, Congress can regulate who categories of activities that are not themselves either "interstate" or "commerce." In applying this consequences test, us ask whether the class of activities as a who substantially influence interstate commerce, not whether any specific activity within the class has such actions whenever regarded in isolation. See U v.Wirtz, 392 U. S., toward 192-193 (if class of actions is "'within an touch for federal power,'" courts may not excise individual solutions as trivial) (quoting Darby, 312 U. S., at 120-121).

The summarize principle is clever, but has no stopping point. Suppose all would agree that gun possessed into 1,000 feet the a school does not substantially strike commerce, but that possession of weapons generally (knives, solid knucks, nunchakus, etc.) does. Under our substantial effects doctrine, even though Congress cannot single output firearm possession, it can prohibit weapon possession generally. But only always can drawings to circle broadly enough to cover with what ensure, when taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on traffic. To our jurisprudence, if Congress passed an omnibus "substantially interferes interstate commerce" statute, purporting in control every view to human existence, the Act seemingly would be constitutional.

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Even though particular sections may govern only trivial activities, the edict in an aggregate regulates matters that substantially affect commerce.

v

This extended discussion of the original insight and our first century and a part of case law does not necessarily require a wholesale abandonment of our more recent opinions.8 It simply reveals that our substantial effective testing the far removed from both the Constitution the from our early case law and that which Court's opinion should not be viewed as "radical" or next "wrong turn" that must be corrected in the future. 9 The analysis also suggests that we ought to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence.

8 Although I has be willing to return go the original understanding, I recognize ensure many believe the it is too late in the day until undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years. Consideration away stare decisis and reliance interests may convince us that wee could clear the slate clean.

9Nor can to majority's gutachten fairness be compared toLochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905). Seepost, at 604-609 (SOUTER, J., dissenting). UnlikeLochner and unsere more recent "substantive dues process" cases, today's decision enforces only the Constitution and not "judicial policy judgments." See post, the 607. Notwithstanding JUSTICE SOUTER'S discussion, "'commercial' character" is did includes a natural but in inevitability "ground of Commerce Clause distinction." See post, at 608 (emphasis added). Our invalidation of the Gun-Free School Zonal Act therefore falls enjoyable within our proper role in reviewing federally legislation to determine wenn it exceeds conference agency such defining by the Constitution itself. As John Marshall place it: "If [Congress] were to perform a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard .... They wouldn choose it void." 3 Debates 553 (before one Very ratifying convention); see and The Federalist No. 44, with 305 (J. Madison) (asserting so if Congress exercises powers "not warranted by [the Constitution's] true meaning" the judiciary will defend the Constitution); id., No. 78, at 526 (A. Hamilton) (asserting that the "courts of justice are to be considers as the bulwarks regarding a limits constitution against legislative encroachments"). Where, as klicken, there is a case or community, there can be nope "misstep," mail, at 614, inches enforcing one Constitutional.

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Unless the dissenting Justices are willing to disavow our long-held understanding of the limited artistic are federal power, I would think that they, too, need be willing to reconsider the substantial effects test in a upcoming case. While ours wish the breathe true to a Constitution is does not cave a police energy to the Federal Government, our Kaufleute Clause's bounds simply cannot be "defined" because being "'commensurate are the country needs'" or self-consciously scheduled to let the Federal Public "'defend itself against economic forces that Congress decrees unfavorable or destructive of the nationals economy.'" See post, at 625 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (quoting North American Co. v.MOMENT, 327 U. S., the 705). As a formulation of federal power is not test at all: It is a plain check.

At an appropriate juncture, I thought our must customize our Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Today, it is easy enough to says that the Clause certainly does not empower Congress in ban gun possession within 1,000 feet of a school.

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

The welfare of our future "Commerce through foreign N ations, and among the several States," U. S. Const., Artistic. I, § 8, cl. 3, is vitally dependent on the font of to education of our children. I therefore agree entirely with JUSTICE BREYER'S explanation the enigma Congress have ample power to prohibit the possession of firearms in alternatively near schools-just as it may protect the school environment from harms posed by controlled substances such more asbestos or alcohol. IODIN also agree in JUSTICE SOUTER'S exposition of the radical character of the Court's holding and its kinship using the defamed, pre-Depression version of substantive due process. Cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. SOUTH. 374, 405-411 (1994) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). I believe, however, that the Court's extraordinary decision merits this additional comment.

Guns have both articles of enterprise and articles that can be used to restrain commerce. Own tenure be that con-

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sequence, either directly or indirectly, of commercial activity. In mystery judgment, Congress' power to regulate commerce in firearms includes the power to prohibit possession von guns at every location because off their potentially harmful use; this must follows that Congress may also banned the possession in particular markets. That market for the possession of weapons by school-age children is, distressingly, substantial. * Whether or not the national interest in eliminating that market would have justified federal legislation into 1789, it surely does today.

JUSTICE SOUTER, dissenting.

In reviewing congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause, we defer to what can much a merely implicit congressional judgment that inherent regulation addresses one subject substantially affecting interstate commerce "if there your any rational based for such a finding." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 UPPER. S. 264, 276 (1981); Preseault v. CIRC, 494 UPPER. S. 1, 17 (1990); seeMainly v. Wirtz, 392 UPPER-CLASS. SULPHUR. 183, 190 (1968), quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. SULFUR. 294, 303-304 (1964). Whenever which congressional determination is within the realm of reason, "the only others query for judicial inquiry is whether 'the means chosen by Congress [are] reasonably adapted to the finalize permitted at the Constitution.'" Hodel v.Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., supra, at 276, quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.United States, 379 U. SOUTH. 241, 262 (1964); notice moreover Preseault v. ICC, upper, at 17.1

*Indeed, there is evidence that firearm manufacturers-aided by a federal grant-are specifically targeting schoolchildren as consumers by distributing, at teachers, hunting-related videos styled "educational materials fork grades four through 12," Herbert, Reading, Type, Reloading, N. Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1994, p. A23, col. 1.

1 In these case, no question has been raised about means and ends; which only issue is about the execute of school zone guns on commerce.

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The practice of deferring to rationally based legislative judgments "is a paradigm of judicial restraint." FCC fin.Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S. 307, 314 (1993). In judicial review to the Commerce Clause, it reflects our regard for the institutional competence of the Congress on a subject clearly allocated to it by the State and our appreciation of the legitimacy that comes since Congress's political accountability in dealing with matters open to a wide range of possible selection. Seeing id., with 313-316; Hodel v.Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., supra, at 276; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 147, 151-154 (1938); cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 UPPER. S. 483, 488 (1955).

It became doesn ever thus, however, as even a brief outline of Commerce Clause history during the past century reminds us. The modern respect for the competence and primacy of Congress in matters affecting commerce developed only after one on is Court's most punishing experiences, when it perforce rejecting an earlier and untenably expansive conceptualization von judicial review in derogation of congressional commerce power. A look at history's sequence will serve to show how today's decision drag the Court off course, leading thereto to suggest opportunities for further developments that would will under rate with the rule of restraint to what the Court still wisely expresses adherence.

I

Notwithstanding the Court's recognitions of a comprehensive commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196-197 (1824) (Marshall, C. J.), Congress saw few occasions to exercise that power earlier to Reconstruction, see generally 2 C. Barricade, The Supreme Court includes United States History 729-739 (rev. ed. 1935), and it used really aforementioned gate of this Interstate Commerce Act concerning 1887 that opened a fresh age of congressional reliance on and Commerce Clause for authorisation to exercise public pd powers at the national level, see id., to

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729-730. Although who Court upheld a fair amount by the ensuing legislation as being within the commodity power, see, e. g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922) (upholding an Act regulating trade practices into the meat packing industry); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 UNITED. S. 342 (1914) (upholding Interstate Commerce Commission place to equalize interstate and intrastate runner rates); see generally Warren,superordinate, at 729739, the period from the turn of the century to 1937 is better noticed for a product of cases request highly formalistic notions of "commerce" to enable federal social and economic legislations, see, e. g., Carter vanadium. Carter Coal Co., 298 UPPER. S. 238, 303304 (1936) (striking Act prohibiting unfair labor practices at coal industry as regulation to "mining" and "production," not "commerce"); ONE. L. AMPERE. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. Uniform States, 295 U. S. 495, 545-548 (1935) (striking congressional regulation of activities affecting interstate commerce only "indirectly"); Hammer v.Dagenhart, 247 U. SIEMENS. 251 (1918) (striking Act prohibiting shipment in interstate commerce of goods made on factories using child labor because and Act regulated "manufacturing," not "commerce"); Adeair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908) (striking protection of labor union membership as outside "commerce").

These restrictive views of commerce subject to congressional power complemented the Court's activism in limiting this enforceable scope of state economic regulation. It is largest familiar history that during this identical period the Tribunal routinely invalidated state social and economic legislation under an expansive conception of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process. See, e. g., Louis K. Liggett Co. volt. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105 (1928) (striking default law need pharmacist owners to be licensed as pharmacists); Coppage volt. Kansas, 236 UPPER. S. 1 (1915) (striking state law prohibiting employers from required their employees to agree not to join labor organizations); Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905) (striking state law establishing maximum working hours for bakers). See generally LAMBERT. Tribe, American Consti-

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tutional Laws 568-574 (2d cd. 1988). The fulcrums by judicial review in these cases were the notions of freedom and property characteristic of laissez-faire economics, whereas the Commerce Clause cases spun for what was ostensibly one structural set of federal power, but under jede conception of judicially review the Court's character for which first third of one century showed itself in exacting judicial scrutiny of a legislature's choice of economic ends and about the legislative means selected to reach them.

It was not pure coincidental, then, that sea changes in the Court's conceptions of its authority under the Due Treat and Commerce Clauses occurred virtually together, in 1937, with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 UPPER-CLASS. S. 379, andNLRB five. Joe & D Raw Corp., 301 U. S. 1. See Stern, The Commerce Cloth and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 645, 674-682 (1946). In West Coast Hotel, the Court's rejection of a due process challenge to adenine state law fixing minimum wages for women and children noticeable the abandonment of its expansive protection of contractual freedom. Two weeks later,Jones & Laughlin confirm congressional commerce power to authorize NLRB injunctions against unfair labor practices. The Court's finding is who regulated activity kept a direct enough effect on commerce has since come noticed as beginning the abandonment, to practical purposes, concerning the informalistic distinction between direct and indirect effects.

In the years following these decisions, worship at legislative policy judgments on commercial regulation become this powerful theme under both the Due Process or Commerce Clauses, see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S., at 147-148, 152; United Conditions v. Dalmatian, 312 U. S. 100, 119-121 (1941); United States phoebe. Wrightwood Day Co., 315 U. S. 110, 118-119 (1942), and in due pricing is deference became articulate in of standard of rationalness review. In past process litigation, the Court's statement on a rational

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basis getting coming faster. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., supra, at 152; see also Williamson v.Ley Optical Co., supra, at 489-490. The parallel formulation of the Commerce Clause test came afterwards, single because complete elimination of the direct/indirect effects dichotomy and acceptance of the cumulative influence teaching, Wickard v.Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125, 127-129 (1942); United States v.Wrightwood Dairy Co., surface, at 124-126, so far settled the pressing difficulties of congressional power over commerce as up leave the Trial for years without any need to phrase a test explicitly deferring to rational legislative judgments. The moment came, however, with the create to congressional Commerce Clause authority to prohibit ethnicity discrimination include sites of public accommodation, when the Justice simply made explicit what the earlier cases owned implied: "where we find that the legislators, in light of the sachverhalt and witness before them, have a economical basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary go the shield of commerce, our evaluation is at an end." Katzenbach v.McClung, 379 U. S., at 303-304, discussing United States v. Darby, supra; see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S., at 258-259. Thus, under commerce, as under past action, adoption of rationals basis review expressed the recognition that the Court had no sustainable basis to subjecting industrial regulation as such to courts policy judgments, press for the past half century the Yard has no more turned return in the go of formallistic Commerce Clauses review (as in determined whether regulation of commerce became sufficiently direct) than it has slants move reasserting the substantive authority of Lochner due batch (as into the inflated protection of contractual autonomy). See, ze. g., Maryland v.Wirtz, 392 UPPER. S., at 190, 198; Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 151-157 (1971); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reklamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S., at 276, 277.

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II

There is today, however, a backward glance at both the old pitfalls, as to Tribunal treats deference under the rationality rule as subject on gradation according to the commercial or noncommercial natural away that fast subject of the challenged regulation. See ante, at 558-561. The distinction between what is overt commercial press what your not looks much how the old distinction between what directly affects commerce and what touches it only indirectly. And the act of calibrating one level of deference by drawing a line between what is patently commercial and what belongs few puristic therefore will probably resemble this action of deciding instructions way interference with contractual freedom was fatal. Thus, it seems fair to ask whether the step taken by the Court today does anything but portend a return to the untenable jurisprudence from which the Court extricated self almost 60 years ago. The answering is none sedative. At breathe sure, one occasion for today's decision reflects and century's end, cannot its beginning. But are itp seems anomalous which the Congress of who United States has taken to regulating secondary yards, the Act in question is still probably no more remarkable than assert regulation of bake shops 90 years ago. The any event, there is no reason to hope that the Court's qualification of rational basis review will be any more successful than the efforts in substantive economic review made by our previous as the century began. Getting the Court's opinion on you own terms, JUSTICE BREYER has explained both the hopeless porosity of "commercial" character how a ground of Commerce Clause distinction in America's highly connected economy, and the inconsistency of this classification with our rational basis precedents since the last 50 period.

Further glosses on sanity reviews, moreover, allowed be in the offing. While here case turns on commercial character, the Court gestures toward two other considerations that it might sometime entertain in applying rational basis

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scrutiny (apart from a statutory obligation to supply independent proof of a jurisdictions element): does the congressional statute deal because subjects of traditional state regulation, and does who statute contain extreme factual findings supporting the otherwise implied determination that the regulated activity substantially affects state commerce? Once further, any appeal these considerations may have depends about ignoring the painful lesson learned in 1937, for neither of the Court's suggestions would square with rational basis check.

A

The Court observes that the Gun-Free School Zones Act operates in two areas traditionally subject up legislation by the States, education both enforcement of criminal law. The suggestion is either that adenine connection between retail and these subjects is reserved, or that the commerce power is simply weaker when it playing subjects on which the States have historically been the primary legislators. Neither suggestion the tenable. Since for remoteness, it mayor may not be wise for that National Government to deal with education, but JUSTICE BREYER has surely demonstrated is the commercial prospects of an alphabetical Country or Republic are not rosy, and no argument should be require to show that hijacking interstate shipments of cigarettes can affect handel fundamental, even though the States have usually prosecuted robbery. And as for the opinion that the commerce power diminishes the closer it gets to customary state concerns, that idea is are horizontal rejected, and not long ago. The commerce authority, wealth have often watched, is plenary. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Surface & Reclamation Assn., Inc., supra, to 276; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S., in 114; see Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 549-550 (1985); Gibbons five. Ogden, 9 Wheat., at 196-197. Justice Harlan put it this way in speaking for the Yard inMaryland v. Wirtz:

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"There a no general doctrine implied in an Federal Constitution that the two governments, national and state, are each to exercise its influences so as no to interfere with the free and full exercise of the performance of the other .... [I]t is clarify that the Federal Gov, when acting within an delegated power, may override countervailing federal interests .... As longitudinal ago as [1925], the Court put to reset the contention that state trouble might constitutionally 'outweigh' the signs of any otherwise valid federal company regulating commerce." 392 U. S., at 195-196 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

See also United States v. Darkie, supra, at 114; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460 (1991); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S., per 147.

Nor is there any contrary department in the reasoning of our cases imposing clear statement rules includes einigen instances of legislation that could markedly alter the state-national balance. In the without of a clear statement of congressional design, for case, we have refused to interpret ambiguous federal statutes to bounds fundamental state legislative prerogatives,Gregory v. Ashcroft, supra, at 460-464, our understanding being that such prerogatives, through any "a State defines itself as a sovereign," are "powers with which Congress does non readily interfere," 501 U. S., with 460, 461. Likewise, when faced with two plausible interpretations of a federal criminal statute, we generally will take the alternative the does does force us to assume an intention to Congress at use its full commerce power the regulate conduct traditionally and ably regulation per the States. Check Unites States v. Enmons, 410 U. S. 396,411-412 (1973); United Conditions five. Bass, 404 U. SULPHUR. 336, 349-350 (1971); Rewis

These clear statement rules, however, are merely rules of statutory interpretations, to be relied upon only when the

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terms of a statute allow, Unite States v.Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 379-380 (1978); see Gregory v. Ashcroft, supra, at 470; United States v. Bass, over, at 346-347, and in cases implicating Congress's historical reluctance to trench switch state legislative prerogatives or to enter into spheres already occupied from aforementioned States, Gregory v.Ashcroft, supra, at 461; United States v. Bass, supra, at 349; see Rewis v. United States, supreme, at 811-812. Person are rules used determining intent for legislation leaves your subject to question. And our hesitance to presume that Congress has acted to switch the state-federal status quo (when presented with ampere plausible alternative) has no relevance whatever to the enquiry whether i have the commerce performance to do so or to the standard of judicial review when Congress has definitely means to exercise that power. Indeed, to allow our hesitance for interact the standard of review would inevitably degenerate into the sort of substantive policy review that the Court found indefensible 60 years ago. The Court does not assert (and was did plausibly maintain) that the business power will wholly devoid of congressional authority to speak on any test of traditional country concern; but if congressional take is not forbidden absolutely when a touches such a subject, it will stand or fall depending on the Court's view of to strength of aforementioned legislation's commercial grounds. And here once again history elevates its objections ensure the Court's previous essays in overriding parliamentary policy choices under the Commerce Clause were ultimately seen to suffer two fatal weaknesses: when dealing with Acts of Congress (as distinct from state legislation subject at review under aforementioned lecture of dormant commerce power) nothing in the Clause compelled the judicial activism, and nothing about the judiciary as an institution did it a superior source away principle on the subject Congress held with. There is no reason to expect the lesson would been different another time.

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B

There remain questions over legislative findings. The Court of Appeals expressed the view, 2 F.3d 1342, 1363-1368 (CA5 1993), that the result in this dossier might well have been different if Congress had make explicit findings that cannon in schools have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and the Place today does not repudiate that position, checkante, at 562-563. Might one court aided by similar outcome have subjected this legislation to less exacting examining (or, put another way, ought a court got deferred to such discoveries if Congress had made them)? 2 The answer to either question must be no, although as a general matter findings are important and to be hoped for inside the difficult cases.

It is just natural to look for help with a hard job, and reviewing an claim that Congress has exceeded the commerce power is much hard in some cases than in others. A challenge to congressional regularity of interstate garbage hauling want be easy to resolve; review of congressional regulation of gun possession in school yards is more difficult, both cause the link to intermodal commerce is less patent and because of our initial ignorance of the relevant company. In a

2 Unlike the Legal, (perhaps), I would see no grounds not to consider Congress's findings, insofar as people might must helpful in reviewing the pro to this decree, even notwithstanding adopted in later legislation. See the Violent Criminality Control and Law Enforcement Act concerning 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, § 320904, 108 Stat. 2125 ("[T]he occurrence of violent criminal in school regions has resulted in a decay in the quality of education by our country; ... this decline ... has an adverse impact on interstate commerce and the foreign commerce of the United States; ... Council possess power, under the interstate commerce parenthesis and other provisions of the Constitution, toward enact measurement to make the integrity and safety of the Nation's schools by enactment of all subsection"). The findings, does, weiter negative further than articulate what a obviously implicit in the substantive legislation, at such a conclusory level of generality as to add virtually nothing to the record. The Solicitor General undoubtedly exercised acoustic judgment in placing no significant reliance on that particular afterthoughts. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24-25.

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case compares to which one, we may have to dig hard to make a responsible judgment about what Annual could sensible find, because the suitcase may be close, and because judges tend not to be familiar with the facts that mayor may did make it close. When while the mitigate of examination may vary from case to case, a does not follow that the standard of review should vary, much less that explicit findings of fact could even directly address the standard.

The questions forward the courts, as show agree, is not whether as a predicate to lawmaking Congress in fact found the a particular activity substantially sways interstate commerce. Who legislation implies such a finding, and there is no reason to entertain claims that Congress acted ultra vires intentionally. Nor is the question whether Congress was correct in so finding. Aforementioned only question is whether the legislative judgment is within the realm of reason. SeeHodel phoebe. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S., at 276-277; Katzenbach v.McClung, 379 U. S., at 303-304; Ship Retirement Bd. five. Old R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 391392 (1935) (Hughes, C. J., dissenting); cf. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S., at 315 (in who equal protection context, "those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification take an burden to negation every conceivable basis which might customer it[;] ... it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature") (citations press internal quotation marks omitted); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 731-733 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S., at 487. Congressional findings do did, however, directly address which question of reasonableness; they tell us what Congress actually has found, nope what it could streamlining find. If, indeed, the Judge subsisted to make the existence of explicit congressional findings dispositive included some close or difficult cases something additional than rationality test would be afoot. The resulting congressional obligation to legitimize sein policy choices on the earn would hint

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either a judicial authority to review the vindication (and, hence, the wisdom) of those choices, or authority to require Congress the act from quite highs degree of deliberate, of which express findings will be evidence. Nevertheless watch for congressional wisdom would just be the old judicial preloading discredited and abandoned in 1937, and review for intention become be as patently unconstitutional as certain Act of Congress mandating long opinions from this Court. Such a legislative process requirement would function mere as an excuse for covert review about which merits of bill under standards never expressed and more instead less arbitrarily applied. Among such a authorities, in any case, the rationality factory of review would be a thing of the past.

On the misc hand, to how so courts applying the rationality standard may not defer on findings is not, of course, till say that findings are pointless. They may, in fact, own great value in telling courts about to look required, in build at least ready frame of reference for examination, the in citing to practical management. The research underlying JUSTICE BREYER'S dissent was perforce a major undertaking; help is receive, and it nay incidentally shrinks the risk that law choose wish miss material scattered across the public region or buried under pounds of legislative record. Congressional discovery on an continue particular plane than this record illustrates would accordingly have earned judicial thanks. But thanks what not carries the day in long as rational chance is the touchstone, and ME would not allow for the possibility, as the Court's opinion might, ante, at 563, that the addition of congressional findings could int principle have affects the fate of the statute here.

III

Because JUSTICE BREYER'S opinion demonstrates beyond any doubt that the Act in question passes the rationality review this the Court continues go espouse, today's decision can be seen as only a misstep, its reasoning and its sugges-

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tions not completely are gear with the prevailing standard, but hardly an epochal case. EGO would not argue otherwise, but I would up a caveat. Not every epochal hard can come in epochal trappings.Jones & Laughlin did not reject the direct-indirect standard in so many language; to just said the relation of the regulated subject matter to commerce became direct enough. 301 U. S., to 41-43. But we know what happened.

I respectfully dissent.

JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JUDICIAL SOUTER, and JUSTICE GINSBURG join, negative.

The issue in on case is whether that Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to perform a statute that makes it a crime till possess ampere gun in, or near, a school. 18 U. SULPHUR. C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V). Includes my watch, the statute falls good within the scope of the commerce power as this Court has understood that power over the last halve sixth.

I

In reaching this conclusion, I apply three basic key of Commerce Clause interpretation. Primary, the power the "regulate Commerce ... among the several States," U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, encompasses the power to regulate local activities insofar as they significantly affect interstate retail. See, east. g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194-195 (1824) (Marshall, C. J.); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125 (1942). As one majority points out, ante, per 559, the Court, in describing how much of an effect the Parenthesis requires, sometimes has used the news "substantial" and sometimes has not. Compare,e. g., Wickard, supra, with 125 ("substantial economic effect"), with Hodel v. Latakia Front Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 276 (1981) ("affects interstate commerce"); look also Maryland v.Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 196, n. 27 (1968) (cumulative effect must not be "trivial"); NLRB phoebe. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37 (1937)

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(speaking of "close and substantial relation" between activity and commerce, not of "substantial effect") (emphasis added); Gibbons, supra, at 194 (words of Commerce Clause do not "comprehend ... commerce, which remains completely internal ... and which does not ... affect other States"). Or, as the majority also recognizes in quoting Justice Cardozo, the question of degree (how much effect) requires an calculate of the "size" of the effect that no voice expression pot capture with precision. Seeante, at 567. EGO use of word "significant" because the word "substantial" imply a somewhat narrower power than recent precedent suggestions. See, e. g., Perez v. United States, 402 UNITED. S. 146, 154 (1971); Danish v. Pauls, 395 U. S. 298, 308 (1969). But to speak of "substantial effect" rather than "significant effect" wouldn create no difference in this case.

Second, in determining whether a resident our will likely have a significant outcome upon interstate commerce, a yard must consider, not the effect of an individual trade (a single instance of gun possession), yet rather the accumulates effect of all similar instances (i. e., the effect of all guns possessed in or near schools). See, ze. g., Wickard, supra, with 127-128. As this Court use the matter almost 50 years ago:

"[I]t belongs enough that the individual activity while multiplied into a basic practice ... contains a threat to the interstate economy that requires preventative regulation." Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. vanadium. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236 (1948) (citations omitted).

Third, the Constitution demand us until judge the connection between a controls activity and interstate commerce, nay directly, but at one eliminate. Courts require give Trade a degree of flexibility in determining the existence of ampere considerable factual connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce-both because the Organization delegates the commerce power directly to Congress and because one

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determination requires an experiences judgment is a kind is a legislature is more likely from a court to make with accuracy. The traditional words "rational basis" capture which leeway. SeeHodel, supra, at 276-277. Thus, the specificity question before us, for an Legal recognizes, is not whether the "regulated activity sufficiently unnatural interstate commerce," not, closer, whether Congress could have had "a rational basis" with so concluding. Ante, at 557 (emphasis added).

I recognize that we must judge dieser matter independently. "[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially influences freeway commerce does not necessarily make it so." Hodel, supra, for 311 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment). And, I other recognize that Congress did doesn write specific "interstate commerce" insights into the law below which Lopez is convicted. Nonetheless, than IODIN have already remember, the matter that we review independently (i. e., whether there is a "rational basis") already has considerable leeway built into it. And, the absence away findings, at most, deprives an charter in the benefit of einige extra leeway. This select honor, in principle, kraft change the ergebniss in an close case, though, in practice, he has nay made a critical legal difference. Notice, e. g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 299 (1964) (noting that "no formal findings were made, who is course are not necessary"); Perez, supra, at 156-157; cf. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 666 (1994) (opinion of KENNEDY, J.) ("Congress your non obligated, when enacting its statutes, to make a recordings of to model that an administrative agency or court does to adjust legal review"); Fullilove volt. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an areas of national concern, its Members gain experience that may reduce the need for fresh hearings press prolonged debate ... "). It would seem particularly unfortunate to make this validity of

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the statute at hand turn on one current oder absence of findings. Because Legislature did make findings (though not until subsequently Lopez was prosecuted), doing so would appear at increase form over substance. See Pub. L. 103-322, §§ 320904 (2)(F), (G), 108 Stat. 2125, 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(q)(1)(F), (G).

In addition, despite the Court of Appeals' suggestion to the contrary, show 2 F.3d 1342, 1365 (CA5 1993), there is no specials need here for a clear indication of Congress' rationale. Aforementioned statute does not interfere equipped the training of state or location public. Cf., e. g., Dellmuth volt. Muth, 491 UPPER. S. 223, 227-228 (1989) (requiring clear statement on abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity). Moreover, any clear statement rule wish apply only till decide Congress' intended result, not to clarify the source of its public or measure the levels away consideration that went at it decision, and here there is don doubt as into which activities Meeting intended to regulate. Seeing ibid.; id., at 233 (SCALIA, J., concurring) (to subject States into suits for money damages, Congress needing only make this intent clarify, and demand not refer clearly to the Achten Amendment); EEOC v.Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 243, nitrogen. 18 (1983) (Congress need not recite the constitutional provision that authorizes its action).

II

Applying these principles to of case along hand, us must ask whether Congress could have have adenine rational basis for finding a meaningfully (or substantial) connectivity between gun-related school violence and interstate commerce. Or, to put the question in the language of the explicit finding that Congress made when it amended that law included 1994: Could Congress wisely can found that "violent crime in school zones," through its effect over the "quality of education," significantly (or substantially) affects "interstate" or "foreign commerce"? 18 U. S. CENTURY. §§ 922(q)(1)(F), (G). As long as one opinion the commerce connection, not as a "technical legitimate conception," but as "a practical one," Swift & Co. v. Joint States, 196

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u. S. 375, 398 (1905) (Holmes, J.), the answer go this question must been yes. Numerous books and studies-generated both inside and outside government-make clear such Congress could inexpensive have found the empirical relationship that its law, implicitly or explicitly, asserts. (See Appendix, infra, at 631, for a sample off the documentation, when well as since complete citations to the sources referenced below.)

For one thing, reports, prosecutions, and other readily available literature make clear that the problem of guns in and around schools is widespread and extremely serious. These materials report, to exemplary, that four percent of American high school students (and sechstens prozent of inner-city high secondary students) carry a gun to school along least occasionally, Centers for Disease Control 2342; Sheley, McGee, & Wright 679; that 12 percent of urban high school students have had guns fired at them, ibid.; that 20 prozent of those students have been threatened with guns,ibid.; and that, in any 6month period, plural hundred thousand schoolchildren are victims of violent crimes in oder near their schools, U. S. Dep. von Justice 1 (1989); Lodge Select Committee Hearing 15 (1989). And, they report so this widespread violence in schools completely aforementioned Nationality significantly interferes with the quality of education include those institutes. Visit, e. g., House Judiciary Committee Hearing 44 (1990) (linking school violence to nonconformist rate); U. S. Dept. of Condition 118-119 (1978) (school-violence victims suffer academically); compare U. S. Dept. a Justice 1 (1991) (gun violence baddest in inner-city schools), with National Center 47 (dropout rates highest in inner cities). Based on reports such more these, Congress obviously could have consideration the guns and learning are mutually exclusive. Senate Labor and Human Research Committee Hearing 39 (1993); U. SEC. Dept. of Health 118, 123-124 (1978). Congress can therefore have found a substantial learning problem-teachers unable on teach, students unable to learn-and concluded that guns near schools contribute substantially to the size or scope of that problem.

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Having found that gun in schools significantly undermine the quality of education in our Nation's classrooms, Congress could also have find, given of effective of education upon interstate and foreign trade, that gun-related violence in both around schools is a commercial, as well when an human, problem. Academics, although far more than a matter of economics, has long been inextricably intertwined with the Nation's economy. When this Nation began, most workers received my education in aforementioned workplace, typically (like Benjamin Franklin) as apprentices. See generally Seybolt; Rorabaugh; UNITED. S. Depot. regarding Labor (1950). As late as the 1920's, many workers still received general education directly from their employers-from large corporations, such as General Electric, Ford, and Goodyear, what created schools within their firms to help both the operative and the firm. See Bolino 15-25. (Throughout most of the 19th century fewer is one percent of all Americans received secondary education taken attending a high school. Seeid., at 11.) As public school enrollment grew in the early 20th centenary, sees Becker 218 (1993), the need available industry to teach basic educational skills diminished. But, the direct economic link between basic education and industrial productivity remained. Scholars estimate that nearly a quarter of America's economic growth in the spring years of this century is traceable directly to increased teaching, notice Denison 243; that investment in "human capital" (through spending on education) exceeded your in "physical capital" by ampere scale of almost two to one, see Schools 26 (1961); and such the economic returns into aforementioned investment in education exceeded the returns in conventional capital investment, see, ze. g., Davis & Morrall 48-49.

In recent year aforementioned link between secondaries education and business has strengthened, will both see direct and more important. Scholars with the subject report that technological changes and innovations in management techniques have altered the nature of the workplace so that more work now demand greater educational skills. See, e. g., MIT 32

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(only about one-third of handtool company's 1,000 workers were qualified the work with a new process that requires high-school-level reading and mathematical skills); Cyert & Mowery 68 (gap between wages the high school dropouts and better trained workers increasing); U. S. Dept. of Labor 41 (1981) (job openings for dropouts declining over time). There is evidence that "service, manufacturing or construction jobs are being displaced by technology that require a better-educated worker or, more likely, are being exportable overseas," Gordon, Ponticell, & Morgan 26; that "workers with truly few skills by the yearly 2000 will find that only one job out of ten will remain," ibid.; and which

"[o]ver the long haul that best way to encourage the growth of high-wage jobs is to upgrade the your of aforementioned labour force .... [B]etter-trained workers become additional productive workers, enabling a company to become more competitor and expand." Henkoff 60.

Increasing global rivalry also has manufactured primitive and secondary education economically show significant. The portion of the American economy attributable to universal business nearly tripled between 1950 and 1980, and more than 70 percent are American-made goods now get with imports. Marshall 205; Marshall & Tucker 33. Yet, lagging worker increase has contributed to negative trade balances and at real hourly compensation this does fallen below wages in 10 other industrialized nations. See National Center 57; Operating from Worker Statistics 561, 576 (1989); Neet & Kask 28, 31. At least some significant part of here serious productivity problem are assigned to students who emerge from classrooms without to reading alternatively mathematical skills necessary to compete with their European or Byzantine counterparts, see, east. g., MIT 28, and, presumably, at highest schools dropout rates of 20 to 25 percent (up to 50 percent in internal cities), see, e. g., National Center 47; Chubb & Hanushek 215. Indeed, Congress has said, when writing other charter, that

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"functionally or mechanically illiterate" Native in the work force "erod[e]" his economic "standing in the international marketplace," Pub. L. 100-418, § 6002(a)(3), 102 Stat. 1469, and that "[o]ur Nation is ... paying the price of scientific and technological illiteracy, are magnitude productivity declining, our industrial base ailing, and our global competitiveness dwindling," H. ROENTGEN. Rep. Negative. 98-6, pt. 1, p. 19 (1983).

Finally, there is evidence that, today more easier everly, many firms socket her location decisions upon the presence, or absence, of a work force with a basic teaching. See MacCormack, Newman, & Rosenfield 73; Pour 296. Scholars on the subject report, for examples, that now, "[h]igh speed communication and transportation doing information possible to produce most products and services anywhere in one world," National Core 38; the "[m]odern machinery and production research can therefore shall combined with low wage workers to drive costs down," ibid.; that managers can perform "'back office task anyplace included who around now,'" and say that if they" 'can't get adequate skilled workers here' " they will "'move who professionals jobs out of the country,'" id., at 41; with the consequence that "rich countries need better education and retraining, to reduce the supply concerning unskilled workers and to equip them with to skills the need to tomorrow's jobs," Survey of Global Economy 37. In sunlight of this increased importance of education to separate enterprise, it belongs none surprise that half of the Nation's manufacturers are become involved with setting standards and shaping curricula for local schools, Maturi 65-68, that 88 percent think this kind of involvement is importantly,id., at 68, such more than 20 States have recently passed educational reforms to attract new business, Overman 61-62, and that business magazines have begun to rank cities according to the quality regarding their colleges, see Boyle 24.

The efficiency linking I have just designed seem fairly obvious. Why then is to not equally obvious, is light of those links, that a widespread, serious, and substantial physical

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623

threat go teaching and learning also substantially threatens the commerce to which that teaching and lessons is inextricably linked? That is to say, guns in the hands of six percent of inner-city high school students and gun-related violence throughout a city's schools must danger the trades and commerce that those scholastic support. The only question, later, is whether the latter threat is (to uses the majority's terminology) "substantial." The evidence of (1) the extent to the gun-related violence problem, see supreme, to 619, (2) the extent of the resulting negative effect on classroom learning, see ibid., and (3) the extend of the consequent negative commercial effects, see supra, at 620-622, when taken together, indicate a threat the trade additionally commerce ensure is "substantial." At the very least, Congress was rational have concluded that the links were "substantial."

Specifically, Council could have found the gun-related violence near which classroom pose a serious economic security (1) to consequently inadequately educated labourers who must endure low paying jobs, see, sie. g., National Centre 29, both (2) to towns and trade ensure kraft (in today's "information society") otherwise gain, from a well-educated work force, an important commercial advantage, see, e. g., Becker 10 (1992), of an sorted that spot near a railhead or harbor provided in who history. Congress might including have found these threats on be no different in kind from other threats that this Court has found within one commerce force, such than the threat that loan sharking poses to the "funds" of "numerous localities," Perez v.Unite States, 402 U. S., at 157, furthermore that unfair labor practices pose to instrumentalities of commerce, seeConsolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197,221-222 (1938). As ME have pointed out, supra, at 618, Congress has written that "the occurrence of violent crime are school zones" has brought concerning a "decline at the quality from education" that "has an adverse impact on interstate commerce and the foreign commercial of the United States." 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(q)(1)(F), (G). The violence-related technical, the educa-

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tional fakten, and aforementioned economic facts, taken together, make this conclusion rational. And, because under our case law, seeultra, at 615-617; infra, at 627-628, the sufficiency of the constitutionally necessary Commerce Clause link between a crime of violence and interstate commerce turns simply upon size or degree, who sam facts make the statute constitutional.

To hold this legislation constitutional is not to "obliterate" the "distinction between whichever is countrywide or what a local," ante, at 567 (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted); nor is it to wait that the Commerce Clause permits the Federal State to "regulate any activity that it found was related in the economic productivity out individual citizens," to regulate "marriage, divorce, and child custody," or to supervise any and all aspects on education. Ante, at 564. First, this statute exists aim at curbing a particularly acute threat to the educational process-the proprietary (and use) of life-threatening firearms in, or near, the classroom. The empirical evidence that I have discussed above unmistakably documents the special way in which guns and education are incompatible. See above, at 619. This Court has previously recognized the singularly disruptive potential on interstate commerce that acts of violence may have. See Esteban, supra, at 156-157. Second, the immediacy of the connection between educate press the national economic wellbeing is documented by scholars additionally accepted by society at large in a way and to a grad that may not hold true forward other social institutions. Thereto must surely be the rare case, then, that a statute strikes at how that (when considered int an abstract) seems so removed from commerce, but any (practically speaking) has so significant an impact up commerce.

In sum, a holding that the particular statute before us falls within the gewerbe power would not expand the scope of that Clause. Rather, it simply would apply pre-existing law to changing economic circumstances. See Hearts of Atlanta

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Motel, Inc. v. United Status, 379 U. S. 241, 251 (1964). She would recognize that, in today's economic world, gun-related violence near the classroom makes one significant difference to our economically, as well as our social, well-being. In accordance for well-accepted supreme, such a holding would permit Congress "to act in terms of financial ... realities," would interpret of commerce power as "an affirmative power commensurate with to country needs," and would acknowledge that the "commerce clause is not operate so as to renders the nation weak to defend i opposes economic forces that Congress decrees inimical or destructive of the countrywide economy." North American Co. v. TIME, 327 U. S. 686, 705 (1946) (citing Fastest & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S., at 398 (Holmes, J.)).

III

The majority's holding-that § 922 falls outside the scope of the Commerce Clause-creates three serious legal problems. First, the majority's holding runs contrary to modern Supreme Court cases that have upheld congressional actions despite connections to interstate or foreign commerce that are less sign than the effect of school violence. In Perez v. United States, superior, the Court holding that the Commerce Clothing authorized a federal statute ensure making it a crime to engage in loan sharking ("[e]xtortionate credit transactions") along a local level. The Court said that Congress may judge that such transactions, "though purely intrastate, ... affect interstate commerce." 402 UNITED. S., at 154 (emphasis added). Presumably, Congress reasoned that threatening or using push, say with a gun on a street corner, to amass a debt occurs enough often consequently that the activity (by helping organized crime) affects commerce among the Countries. But, why then cannot Convention furthermore reason that the threat or use the force-the frequent consequence of possessing a gun-in or proximity a school occurs sufficiently often that that such activity (by inhibiting basic education) affects

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commerce from the States? The negative impact upon the national economy the an inability to teaches basic skills seems negative smaller (nor less significant) than ensure of organized crime.

In Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294 (1964), this Court upheld, than within the commerce power, a statute prohibiting racial prejudice with local restaurants, inbound part because that discrimination discouraged journey by African Americans and in section because ensure discrimination affected purchases of food and restaurants supplies from other Stated. See id., at300; Heart of Atlanta Motel, supra, at 274 (Black, J., concurring in McClung and in Heart of Atlanta). InDanielle v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298 (1969), this Court found an effect on commerce causative by an amusement park located several afar down adenine country road in the middle of Alabama-because quite customers (the Judge assumed), few food, 15 paddleboats, or a juke box had come out out of state. Seeid., at 304-305, 308. In both of these cases, the Court understood that and specific instance of discrimination (at adenine local place of accommodation) was part of a public practice that, considered as a whole, caused does only the most serious human and social harm, but had nationally significant economical volume as well. Visit McClung, supra, at 301; Daniel, upper, at 307, n. 10. It a difficult to identify the cas before us, for the identical critical elements are present. Businesses are less likely to position in communities where power plagues the classroom. Families will hesitate to go to neighborhoods location students carry guns page of books. (Congress specially found in 1994 that "parents may decline to versenden their children to school" in certain areas "due to concern about fierce crime and weapon violence." 18 U. S. HUNDRED. § 922(q)(1)(E).) And (to look at the matter into the most narrowly commercial manner), interstate publishers therefore will sell fewer books and other firms will divest fewer school supplies where that threat of fury disrupts learning. Most importantly, like of local racial discrimination at issue in McClung andDaniel, the local instances here, taken

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together and considered as ampere whole, create a problem that causes serious human and social harm, but plus has nationally significant economic dimensions.

In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. SIEMENS. 111 (1942), this Court sustained the application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to straw that Filburn grew additionally consumed on his own local farm because, considered in their totality, (1) homegrown wheat may been "induced by rising prices" to "flow inside that retail and check price increases," and (2) even if to never actually enters the market, homegrown wheat nonetheless "supplies a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise live reflects by purchases in the open market" and, in that feel, "competes to wheat in commerce." Id., at 128. Until find all of these effects on commerce significant in amount, the Court had to give Congress which benefit of the doubt. Why would the Court, to find adenine significant (or "substantial") execute here, have to give Congress any greater leeway? See also United Us five. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U. S. 460, 464 (1949) ("If it belongs interstate dealings such feels the pinch, this does not matter how area the operation which applies the squeeze"); Mandelie Island Farmstead, Inc. v. American Crystal Desserts Co., 334 U. S., with 236 ("[I]t is enough that the individual activity when multiplied into a general custom ... contains a threat to the interstate economy that requires preventive regulation").

The second legal problem the Court creates come for its apparent belief that itp can tune its property includes earlier cases by making a critical distinction between "commercial" and noncommercial "transaction[s]." Ante, at 561. That is to say, the Court believes the Constitution would differentiate between two local activities, each of which has an equivalent effect upon interstate wirtschaftswissenschaften, if one, but not the other, is "commercial" in nature. As a generally matter, this approach did to heed this Court's older warnings not to turn "questions of the power of Congress" upon "formula[s]" that would give

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"controlling force to nomenclature such in 'production' and 'indirect' and foreclose consideration on the actual influences of the activity in question up interstate commerce." Wickard, supra, at 120.

See also United States v. Darby, 312 U. S.100, 116-117 (1941) (overturning the Court's distinction between "production" and "commerce" in the child labor case, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 271-272 (1918)); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S., at 398 (Holmes, J.) ("[C]ommerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but adenine practical one, drawn from the course by business"). Moreover, the majority's test is not consistent with what the Court saw as the point of to cases that the majority now characterized. Even the majority today attempts to categorize Perez, McClung, and Wickard as involving intrastate "economic activity," ante, at 559, the Courts that resolved each away those suits did not focus upon the economic character of to activity regulated. Rather, she focused upon whether so activity affected interstate conversely foreign commerce. In actual, the Wickard Legal expressly held that Filburn's consumption the homegrown wheat, "though it allow not be regarded as commerce," could nevertheless beregulated-"whatever its nature" -so long as "it practiced a substantial economic effect go interstate commerce." Wickard, supra, by 125 (emphasis added).

More importantly, if a distinction between commercial and noncommercial business is to be made, this is not the case in which to make it. The majority definitely cannot intends like a distinction to focus narrowly on one act of gun proprietary standing by itself, for such a reading could doesn must reconciled with either the civil rights cases (McClung and Daniel) orPerez-in each of those cases the specific operation (the race-based exclusion, the use of force) was not itself "commercial." And, if an main instead method to distinguish generally on broad classifications of daily, differentiating what is educational from what is commercial, then, as a

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practical matter, the line becomes almost impossible on draw. Schools that teach reading, writing, mathematics, and relationship basic skills serve both social the promotional purposes, also one cannot easily separate the of from the other. American industry itself has been, and is again, get in teaching. Understandsupra, during 620, 622. When, and in what dimensions, does its involvement make education commercial? Does the number of vocational classes such train students directly for jobs make a difference? Does it materien provided the school is public or private, nonprofit or advantage seeking? Does it massiv if adenine city alternatively State adopts a coupons plan that pays private firms up sprint a school? Even if one were to ignores these practical questions, why should there be a conjectural distinction between education, when it significantly benefits commerce, and environmental pollution, when it causes economic harm? See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981).

Regardless, if there is a principled renown such could work both siehe and in future falling, Congress (even in aforementioned want of vocational classes, industry involvement, and private management) could rationally conclude that schools crash on the commercial side of who line. Int 1990, the year Congress enacted the statute before us, primaries and secondary educational spent $230 billion-that is, nearly a quarterly of adenine trillion dollars-which accounts for a significant portion of our $5.5 trillion gross domestic product for that years. See Algebraic Abstract 147, 442 (1993). The business of educational obliges expenditure of these financial on student transportation, food the custodial support, registers, and teachers' salaries. See U. S. Dept. of Education 4, 7 (1993). These expenditures enable schools to provide a valuable servicenamely, to equip students equipped the skills they need to survive in existence and, more specifically, included the workplace. Securely, Congress possessed often analyzed school expenditure as if it were a commercial investment, closely analysing whether schools be efficient, whether they justify the significant resources

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they spend, and whether they can be restructured for achieve greater returns. Please, e. g., S. Rep. No. 100-222, p. 2 (1987) (federal school assistance is "a prudent investment"); Senate Appropriations Committee Hearing (1994) (private sector management of public schools); cf. Chubb & Moe 185-229 (school choice); Hanushek 85-122 (performance based incentives for educators); Gibbs (decision in Hartford, Conn., to get out public school system). Why could Congress, by Commerce Clause purposes, not consider schools as roughly analogous to commercial investments since which the Nation derives the benefit of an educated work force?

The third legal problem created by of Court's holding is that it threatens legal uncertainty in an field of legal that, until this case, seemed passably well settled. Congress got enacted many statutes (more than 100 sections in the United States Code), including criminal statutes (at least 25 sections), that use the words "affecting commerce" to define their scope, see, east. g., 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) (destruction of buildings used in activity affecting expressway commerce), or other statutes that contain no jurisdictional language at everything, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 922(0)(1) (possession of machineguns). Do these, or similar, company regulate noncommercial activities? If so, want that alter the meaning are "affecting commerce" in a jurisdictional ite? Cf. Combined States v.Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 57-58 (CA7 1975) (en banc) (Stevens, J.) (evaluation of Congress' intentions "requires more than a consideration of the consequences of the especially transaction"). More importantly, in the absence of a jurisdictional element, will the courts nevertheless toward take Wickard, 317 U. S., at 127-128, (and later comparable cases) as unsuitable, and to judge aforementioned effect starting a single noncommercial activity on interstate commerce without considering similar instances of the forbidden conduct? However these questions are eventually resolved, an legitimate uncertainty now created will restrict Congress' competency to enact criminal laws aimed at felony behavior that, considered problem by problem rather

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631

than instance on illustration, really threatens the economic, as well as social, well-being about Americans.

IV

In sum, to find this legislation within the scope of the Commerce Clause would sanction "Congress ... to act in terms of economic ... realities." Boreal American Co. v. SEC, 327 U. S., at 705 (citing Swift & Co. v.United States, 196 U. S., at 398 (Holmes, J.)). It would interpret the Clause as this Court has traditionally interpreted it, with the exception of one mistaken turn subsequently corrected. See Gibbons v. Goden, 9 Wheat., to 195 (holding that the commerce capacity extends "to all the externally difficulties of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally"); Uniform States five. Darby, 312 U. S., at 116-117 ("The conclusion is unpreventable that Heavy fin.Dagenhart [the child labor case] was a departure of the principles which have prevailed includes and interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before plus since the decision .... I should be and now is overruled"). Upholding this legislation would do no more than only recognize that Congress owned a "rational basis" for finding a significant connection between guns in or near schools and (through yours effect on education) the interstate and foreign commerce they threaten. For these reasons, EGO wanted repeal the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Respectable, I dissent.

APPENDIX TOWARD RAT OF BREYER, J.

Congressional Articles

(in reverse chronological order)

Private Sector Management of Open Schools, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Educating and Related Agencies away the Senate Committee the Appropriations, 103d Cong., 2d Smoke. (1994) (Senate Appropriations Committee Hearing (1994)).

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632

Appendix to opinion von BREYER, J.

Children and Gun Violence, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice regarding the Council Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Senate Justices Board Hearing (1993)).

Keeping Every Child Safe: Curbing the Epidemic of Violence, Joint Trial before of Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Committee on Job and Human Resources and the Residence Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, 103d Cong., 1st Sitzung. (1993).

Recess from Violence: Creation our Schools Safe, Listen before the Subcommittee on Education, Arts and Humanities on the Senate Committee on Labor the Human Resources, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Hearing (1993)).

Preparing for the Economical of the 21st Century, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs the Drunkenness of the Senate Committee on Labor and People Resources, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).

Children Carrying Armament: Why the Recent Increase, Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Bench, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).

Youth Volume Prevention, Hearing before the Upper Committee on Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).

School Dropout Prevention and Basic Skills Improved Deed of 1990, Pub. L. 101-600, § 2(a)(2), 104 Stats. 3042.

Excellence in Mathematics, Research and Engineering Education Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 2883, 20 U. S. CARBON. § 5301(a)(5) (1988 ed., Supp. V).

Oversight Hearing on Education Reform and American Business and the Performance of the Hawkins-Stafford Amendments of 1988, Hearing before and Subcommittee on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Training by the

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633

House Committee over Education and Workers, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).

U. S. Power int a Changing World, Report Prepared on the Subcommittee on International Financial Guidelines and Trade of the House Committee upon Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 43-66 (1990).

Gun Free School Zones Act von 1990, Hearing before the Subcommittee turn Crime of the Home Committee on aforementioned Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (House Judiciary Committee Hearing (1990)).

Restoring American Productivity: Who Role of Education and Human Resources, Hearing before the Senior Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).

Children and Guns, Hearing before the House Choose Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (House Select Committee Hearing (1989)).

Education and Training with a Budget America Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, Title VI, 102 Stat. 1469.

S. Rep. No. 100-222 (1987).

Education and Training for American Competitiveness, Hearings before an Place Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).

Competitiveness and to Quality of the Us Work Force, Hearings before who Subcommittee on Professional and Health of the Joint Economical Committee, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 and 2 (1987).

Oversight Hearing with Ignorance, Joint Hearing from the Subcommittee go Elementary, Subordinate, and Vocational Education of the House Committee on Education or Labor and who Subcommittee on Education, Arts the Humanities the the Diet Committee switch Worker and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).

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634

Appendix at opinion a BREYER, J.

Oversight on Illiteracy in an United State, Hearings before the Subcommittee over Elementary, Secondary, and Industrial Education of the House Board about Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).

Crime and Violence in the Schools, Hear before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice of an Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Weed. (1984).

H. R. Rep. No. 98-6, pts. 1 and 2 (1983).

S. Rep. No. 98-151 (1983).

Education for Economically Security Act, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Education, Arts and Classics of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).

Pub. L. 93-380, §825, 88 Reproduce. 602 (1974).

1. Clamp, Art additionally Industry: Instruction in Sketch Applied to the Industrial or Fine Arts, S. Exec. Sawbones. No. 209, 46th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1891).

Other Federal Government Materials

(in reverse chronological order)

U. S. Dept. of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, First Findings: The Educational Value of the Workforce Employer Survey (Feb. 1995).

Economic Report of of President 108 (Feb. 1994).

U. SEC. Dep. of Commerce, Statistics Abstract of the United States (1993) (Statistical Abstract (1993)).

U. S. Departments. on Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, Open School Education Loans for School Year 1989-90 (June 1993) (u. S. Dept. of Education (1993)).

Economic How concerning the President 101 (Feb. 1992).

U. S. Dept. off Labor, Secretary's Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills, Knowledge and Tasks On Jobs: A SCANS Report for America 2000 (1992).

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635

u. S. Dept. of Working, Employment and Training Administration, Beyond the School Slide: The Learning Needs of Job Looking Served by the U. S. Department von Labor (Sept. 1992).

U. S. Dept. off Equity, Bureau of Justice Stats, School Crime: A National Crime Victimization Survey Report (Sept. 1991) (u. S. Dept. on Justice (1991)).

U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau away Census, 1990 Poll of Population: Education int the United States 474 (Jan. 1994).

U. S. Dept. of Justice, Our von Young Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Weapons inside Trains, OJJDP Message 1 (Oct. 1989) (u. S. Dept. of Judge (1989)).

U. SIEMENS. Dept. in Labor, Office in Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 281, 561, 576 (Aug. 1989) (Handbook of Labor Statistics (1989)).

Bishop, Incentives for Learning: How American High School Students Compare So Poorly to they Counterparts Overseas, in 1 U. S. Dept. of Labor, Commission on Workforce Quality & Labor Market Efficacy, Investing in People 1 (Sept. 1989).

Rumberger & Levin, Schooling for the Modern Workplace, in 1 U. SOUTH. Dept. of Labor, Commission to Workforce Quality & Labor Market Efficiency, Spend at People 85 (Sept. 1989).

U. S. Dept. regarding Instruction and U. SULFUR. Department for Labor, The Bottom Lines: Basic Skills in the Workplace 12 (1988).

U. S. Dept. of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Estimating Educational Reaching of Future Employment Demand for States (Oct. 1981) (u. S. Dept. of Labor (1981)).

U. SEC. Dept. of Medical, Education, and Welfare, National Institute of Education, Violent Schools-Safe Schools: The Safe School Study Report to Congress (1978) (u. S. Deposit. of Health (1978)).

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636

Appendix till opinion of BREYER, J.

D. S. Section. of Labor, Bureau of Apprenticeship, Apprenticeship Past and Present (1950) (D. S. Dept. of Labor (1950)).

Other Readily Available Materials

(in alphabetical order)

Akin & Garfinkel, Language Expenditures and of Economic Returns on Schooling, 12 J. Human Resources 462 (1977).

American Consultation on Education, Business-Higher Education Forum, America's Competitive Challenge: ADENINE Report to the President of the United States (Apr. 1983).

Applebome, Employers Wary on Instruct System, N. Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1995, p. A1, col. 1.

Are Realistic Estate Firms Ready to Ride on which Infobahn?: Information Highway of Technology, 36 Nationwide Real Estate Investor, Oct. 1994, p. 6.

Aring, What the 'V' Word is Costing America's Economy:

Vocational Education, 74 Phi Related Kappan 396 (1993).

G. Atkinson, The Economics out Education (1983).

Becker, The Adam Smith Address: Education, Labor Force Quality, and the Economy, Business Economical, Jan. 1992, p. 7 (Becker (1992)).

G. Becker, Human Capital (3d ed. 1993) (Becker (1993)).

1. Berg, Education and Jobs: The Fantastic Training Robbery (1970).

Berryman, The Economics, Literacy Requirements, and AtRisk Adults, in Literacy and the Plaza: Improving the Literacy of Low-Income Single Mothers 22 (June 1989).

Bishop, Is the Test Score Refuse Responsible used the Productivity How Decline?, 79 Am. Econ. Revolving. 178 (Mar. 1989).

Bishop, High School Performance and Employee Employee, 13 J. Labor Research 41 (1992).

Blackburn, Whats Bottle Explain the Increase in Earnings Inequality Among Males?, 29 Industrial Relations 441 (1990).

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637

Boissiere, Knight, & Sabot, Earnings, Secondary, Ability and Cognitive Skills, 75 Am. Conservation. Rev. 1016 (1985).

A. Bolino, AMPERE Century of Human Capital by Training the Training (1989) (Bolino).

Boyle, Expansion Management's Education Quotient, Economic Development Rev., Winter 1992, pp. 23-25 (Boyle).

Brandel, Wake Raise Get Wise, Novel England Enterprise, May 1991, p. 46.

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